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“fertilization,” or phrases such as “human being at any stage of development,” to
identify the “person”-defining moment in the reproductive process, and these
designations have profound implications for reproductive choice. Proponents are
outspoken in their desire to outlaw abortion, but they are less transparent about
their intent with respect to other aspects of reproductive choice, such as
contraception and infertility treatments.
This paper describes the background of the Personhood Movement and its
attempt to achieve legal protection of the preborn from the earliest moments of
biological development. Following the late 2011 failure of the personhood measure
in Mississippi, the language used within the Movement was dramatically changed in
an attempt to address some of the concerns raised regarding implications for
reproductive choice. Putting abortion to one side, this paper identifies why the
personhood framework that is contemplated by the proposed changes does not
eliminate the potential for restrictions on contraception and in vitro fertilization
(IVF) that put the lives of these newly recognized persons at risk; nor should it if
proponents intend to remain consistent with their position. The paper goes on to
suggest what those restrictions might look like based on recent efforts being
proposed at the state level and frameworks that have already been adopted in other
countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution does not define the word “person.” 1 More
specifically, it does not clearly delineate who or what is included in the concept of
“person” for purposes of bestowing the rights and protections that are found in the
document. 2 Nor does the Constitution tell us when life begins. 3 Some may argue that
defining “personhood” or “life” is best left to philosophers and theologians, but
regardless of the philosophical or religious nature of these questions, the answers
have profound implications for the law.4
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has been unwilling to fully
extend the concept of personhood to the preborn 5 for purposes of interpreting the
1
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973); Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed
Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 371 (2007).
2
See Karen G. Crockett & Miriam Hyman, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of
Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 805, 805 (1975) (“The question of when legal rights inhere in the unborn
has never been clearly resolved.”).
3
See Jason M. Horst, The Meaning of “Life”: The Morning-After Pill, the Question of When Life
Begins, and Judicial Review, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 205, 206 (2006) (“The Court has been able to
avoid dealing directly with [the] question of [when life begins].”).
4
It is not the purpose of this particular article to distinguish between concepts of “life” and
“personhood.” Others have taken up the important task of exploring the nature of personhood, and
“thick” (conscious experience/moral agency/rationality, etc.) v. “thin” (biological) conceptions of life.
See, e.g., Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status,
in E MBRYO E XPERIMENT ’N 65 (Peter Singer et al. eds.,1990); Berg, supra note 1, at 375-76 (citing H.
TRISTRAM E NGELHARDT , JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF B IOETHICS 104 (1986)); Caitlin E. Borgmann,
The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18 COLUM . J. GENDER & L. 551
(2008) [hereinafter Borgmann, Meaning of Life]; Khiara M. Bridges, A Reflection on Personhood and
“Life,” 81 M ISS. L.J. SUPRA 91 (2011); Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of
Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 1285 (2013). While there is certainly more to be said on
these topics, the point of this project is to explore the implications of adopting a certain “thin,”
biological conception of life and personhood as it relates to the potential for legal restrictions on
reproductive choice.
5
Interestingly, in the Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision, it went as far as to say that
“by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the
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Federal Constitution. After all, even viable fetuses are not entitled to the full
complement of constitutional rights and protections. Justice Scalia maintains that the
Constitution would permit individual states to allow “abortions on demand,” if they
wish,6 and if viable fetuses are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, then equal
protection might require all post-viability abortions to be outlawed, without the
exceptions some states permit for rape and incest. 7
Perhaps due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance in this area, federal legislation
has been proposed to specifically designate when human life begins (or when
persons come into existence) for purposes of federal law, 8 and several states (either
through legislation or constitutional amendment) have undertaken measures to adopt
such a personhood framework at the state level. 9 Whether in proposed legislation or
state constitutional amendments, advocates within this Personhood Movement
choose terms like “fertilization,” or phrases such as “human being at any stage of
development,” to identify the person-defining moment in the reproductive process.
These designations have biological and legal significance. 10
Personhood proponents are outspoken in their desire to outlaw abortion, but
they are less transparent about their intent with respect to contraception and
infertility treatments. Since Roe v. Wade, 11 however, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently upheld a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an
abortion. 12 Even if a personhood framework is adopted via statute or state
constitutional amendment in an effort to outlaw abortion, it is entirely possible that
the Court would strike down such provisions at least insofar as they are inconsistent
with a woman’s constitutionally-protected privacy right. That said, any federal
constitutional protection available in the context of access to contraception or
infertility treatments is more tenuous.
Courts and commentators frequently suggest that the U.S. Constitution protects
a fundamental right to procreate, but the nature and scope of that right, to the extent
it exists, is unclear.13 While Supreme Court precedent indicates that a state may not
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007).
While the Court was willing to say that the fetus is at least a living organism, it was apparently not
comfortable defining the fetus as a human life or legal person entitled to the rights and protections
associated therewith. See also Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s
Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization , 13 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC . POL’Y & L. 87, 91 (2005) (noting that “Roe’s failure to define clearly what rights
to personhood a fetus may hold has allowed states to undermine the Supreme Court’s holdings”).
6
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7
Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 581; Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic
Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 E MORY L.J. 843, 846 (2007). For arguments that
abortion would be permissible even if a fetus is considered a “person,” see, e.g., Judith Jarvis
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971); Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My
Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. R EV. 1057 (1999);
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 M ICH . L. R EV. 1569 (1979); Robin West, Liberalism
and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117 (1999). In addition, not all persons are entitled to the same legal
rights. Children have fewer rights than adults, and indeed, the law already recognizes different
definitions of persons for different contexts, as when fetuses are considered persons under certain
criminal or tort statutes. Berg, supra note 1, at 373.
8
See Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. (2013).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Parts III & IV.
11
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
13
See generally Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. R TS. & DEV.
L.J. 1 (2007); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of
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outlaw or restrict access to all types of contraception, 14 it is far less clear whether
access to certain types of birth control could be restricted. 15 This would be
particularly true if a personhood framework passes, given that birth control’s
mechanism of operation is effective after fertilization has taken place. The interest in
protecting the rights of these newly recognized persons could lead to restrictions on
any form of contraception that is or could be effective after fertilization has
occurred. Further, the Supreme Court has yet to suggest that any fundamental right
to procreate includes a right to have access to infertility treatments. 16 Defining
fertilized ova to be persons entitled to legal protection would seem to establish a
strong interest in restricting treatments that put these persons at risk of injury or
death.
This lack of clarity regarding how a personhood framework might impact
reproductive choice outside the abortion context has contributed to the failure of
personhood measures in multiple states, and could be the reason why the federal
Sanctity of Human Life Act, which was co-sponsored by Congressman and former
vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan, did not make it out of congressional
committee when first proposed in 2011. 17 While it may not have been surprising that
personhood initiatives would be soundly defeated in a state such as Colorado, 18 the
late 2011 failure of a proposed personhood amendment to the Mississippi
Constitution sparked drastic changes to the language utilized within the Personhood
Movement. 19 The revised language targets questions raised by previous iterations,
but it does not dispel the most pressing concerns regarding reproductive choice. And
while no state has adopted a personhood framework yet, at least nine states can
Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 1490 (2008) (examining the source of this right and
its limits).
14
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 679 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15
See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135,
1167-72 (2008).
16
Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertili zation, 118
HARV . L. REV. 2792, 2793 (2005) (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of
Genomics, 29 AM . J.L. & M ED. 439, 453 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has never directly confronted
the issue of whether access to [in vitro fertilization] should be considered a constitutionally protected
fundamental right.”)).
17
Nadia Kounang, Could ‘Personhood’ Bills Outlaw IVF?, CNN (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/health/ivf-outlawed/index.html?hpt=he_t4. While Mitt Romney and
Paul Ryan were not elected on November 6, 2012, Paul Ryan was reelected to his congressional seat,
and commentators suggest that his political career will continue to advance. See, e.g., Samuel P.
Jacobs, Despite Loss, Paul Ryan Has Bright Future, R EUTERS (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://news.msn.com/politics/despite-loss-paul-ryan-has-bright-future.
18
One opponent of the initiatives in Colorado recalled the “resounding defeat of [the 2008]
measure,” and suggested that “it was a non-starter [in Colorado].” Electa Draper, “Personhood” Push
Rejected, DENVER POST , Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/nationalpolitics/ci_10900171.
19
The substantive text of the amendments proposed in Colorado in 2008 and 2010, and proposed
in Mississippi in 2011, contained twenty words or less. See infra Part II. The revised language
proposed in Colorado for the 2012 election cycle was over 200 words long. Colo. Initiative 46 (2011)
(proposed
COLO .
C ONST .
art.
II,
§
32),
available
at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011 -2012/46Final.pdf
[hereinafter Appendix I] (the proposal did not receive the requisite number of signatures to get on the
2012 ballot). For the full text of the 2012 Colorado proposal, see infra Appendix I. Colorado
Personhood Amendment Falls Short of Required Signatures to Make Ballot , HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
30, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/colorado-personhood-amend_n_1840602.html.
Similar language was put forward recently in Arkansas, but the Attorney General of Arkansas rejected
the proposal.
See
Ark.
Att’y Gen.
Op.
No. 2012-02
(2012),
available at
http://ag.arkansas.gov/opinions/docs/2012-002.pdf.
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expect to see personhood measures in coming years. 20 As of March 2013, the North
Dakota Senate and House approved an initiative (which will now appear on the
November 2014 ballot) to amend the state constitution to protect “the inalienable
right to life of every human being at any stage of development.”21
How we define “person,” or at what point rights attach to human life, will
directly impact all things surrounding the reproductive process, regardless of the
intent with which that process begins. It is true that such answers will affect the
choices available to women once pregnant, but they will also inevitably impact such
things as the availability of certain birth control options, and the permissiveness of
various forms of assisted reproductive technologies (ART).
The purpose of this article is to show why the revisions found in new
personhood proposals at the state level 22 do not adequately address the concerns
raised regarding potential implications for reproductive choice. If a personhood
framework is adopted, it is likely that restrictions on certain birth control methods
and ART would soon follow. In a future article I will argue that, given the
uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of any procreational liberty protected by
the Constitution, it is very possible that such restrictions would be upheld. 23 In short,
regardless of the implications for abortion, certain forms of contraception and
infertility treatments are particularly susceptible to successful restriction in the event
that a personhood framework is adopted through legislation or state constitutional
amendment. 24
To that end, Part II of the present article will provide a brief background of the
Personhood Movement, including the unexpected failure of the proposed amendment
to the Mississippi Constitution. Part III will explore the nature of the debates in
Mississippi to provide context for debates likely to be held elsewhere, and will also
introduce revisions made within the Personhood Movement to the language of future
proposals in response to the failure in Mississippi. Part IV will then discuss how an
understanding of the relevant biology and physiology of the reproductive
process including contraception and IVF demonstrates why the new language
being proposed within the Personhood Movement should not prove satisfying for
those concerned about the potential for significant restrictions on reproductive
choice. This is not to say that all such reproductive choices would be banned
outright, but Part IV will also offer examples of what those restrictions might look
20
See Personhood Bills and Ballot Initiatives, R ESOLVE : NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N ,
http://www.resolve.org/get-involved/personhood-bills-and-ballot-initiatives.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2013). Further, as the political atmosphere changes, Congress may also revisit the Sanctity of Human
Life Act.
21
Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State Senate, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/07/north-dakota-personhood_n_2640380.html
[hereinafter Bassett, Senate]; Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State House,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/north-dakotapersonhood_n_2934503.html [hereinafter Bassett, House].
22
The language used in the Sanctity of Human Life Act is similar to early iterations of state
personhood proposals, and it thus raises the same issues regarding reproductive choice as those earlier
measures. See infra Parts III & IV. See generally Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong.
(2013).
23
Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Pre-Embryonic Personhood and the Constitutionality of
Restrictions on Reproductive Choice (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
24
See Erik Eckholm, Push for ‘Personhood’ Amendment Represents New Tack in Abortion Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/us/politics/personhood-amendmentswould-ban-nearly-all-abortions.html?pagewanted=all
(suggesting the
proposed
Personhood
Amendment would ban not only most abortions, but also “some birth control methods, including IUDs
and ‘morning-after pills’”).
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like under a personhood framework, assuming proponents intend to remain
consistent with the position.
II. PERSONHOOD MOVEMENT
A. BACKGROUND
Since the Supreme Court acknowledged a woman’s fundamental right to choose
to terminate her pregnancy forty years ago, 25 abortion opponents have been
struggling to limit women’s ability to exercise that right. Over these decades, the
Court has heard dozens of cases addressing the constitutionality of various
restrictions on abortion. 26 While Casey undoubtedly made it easier for states to
impose such restrictions, 27 nothing short of an absolute prohibition on abortion will
appease the staunchest opponents. Acknowledging the “personhood” of the preborn
is thought to be an avenue toward establishing a framework that would achieve this
goal without direct reference to abortion. 28
Proponents of the now nationwide Personhood Movement use as their starting
point Justice Blackmun’s language 29 in Roe that “[i]f this suggestion of [fetal]
personhood is established, the appellant’s case [arguing in favor of women’s
choice], of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” 30 The logic being, that if the legal
personhood of fetuses is established, then this would prompt federal constitutional
protection of the fetuses’ lives31 at the expense of women’s choice.

25

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
27
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-75 (finding that in the past the Court had been too quick to strike down
state restrictions using strict scrutiny analysis and substituting that analysis with the undue burden
standard moving forward).
28
Excluded from this discussion are state statutes proposed either by citizens or the legislature
with language explicitly attempting to restrict abortion. For instance, unsuccessful attempts were
made in Oklahoma and Wyoming in the early 1990s to prohibit abortion except in the narrowest of
circumstances. See Molly E. Carter, Note, Regulating Abortion Through Direct Democracy: The
Liberty of All Versus the Moral Code of a Majority, 91 B.U. L. R EV. 305, 307 (2011) (citing In re
Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1992) and Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League
v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 289 (Wyo. 1994)). A similar effort failed in South Dakota in 2006. See
Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 560. Also excluded from this discussion are statutes
contingently enacted by certain states to ban abortion that would take effect if the Court overturns
Roe. Id. at 560-61 n.50.
29
See What is Personhood?, PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about-us/whatis-personhood (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (indicating that “personhood holds the key to filling the
‘Blackmun Hole’”).
30
Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. But cf. Thomson, supra note 7; Regan, supra note 7; West, supra
note 7; and McDonagh, supra note 7 (arguing that abortion would be permissible even if a fetus is
considered a “person”). Even a strong personhood proponent acknowledges in his Doctor of Juridical
Science dissertation that Justice Blackmun was likely too quick in his assessment. See Charles L.
Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & M ED. 119, 289 (2006) (stating that
Blackmun “may have been premature in suggesting the case for abortion collapses once the unborn
human being attains constitutional personhood, if credence is given to emergent new views that justify
abortion of constitutional persons”).
31
See About Us, PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about-us (last visited Oct.
31, 2013) [hereinafter About Personhood] (stating that Personhood USA intends “to build the support
of at least two thirds of the states in an effort to reaffirm personhood within the U.S. Constitution ”).
26
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Regardless of whether, in fact, state definitions of personhood (or federal
statutory definitions) have any impact on the interpretation of the Federal
Constitution, 32 personhood proponents are clear in their intent to challenge the legal
underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. 33 While statutes or
state constitutional amendments that define personhood may not be effective
themselves in outlawing abortion, the hope is that a challenge to any such statute or
amendment would make its way to the Supreme Court, giving the Court an
opportunity to overturn its prior decisions regarding abortion. 34
The increased wave of attempts by states in the last five years 35 to establish a
personhood framework through statute or constitutional amendment can fairly be
attributed to the work of Kristi Burton. 36 In 2008, Ms. Burton worked with Colorado
for Equal Rights to qualify a voter initiative that proposed an amendment
(Amendment 48) to the Colorado Constitution.37 The text of this initiative, and that
of more recent personhood measures, 38 does not mention abortion, nor does it
include the subordinating language found in Missouri’s preamble.39
32
Professor Borgmann illustrates the point this way: “a state could define a cow as a ‘person’
under state law. In such a case, the [United States Supreme] Court would still have to answer whether
this recognition violated the constitutional rights of anyone recognized as a person under the [F]ederal
Constitution.” Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 576 n.118. In other words, personhood
initiatives themselves would not necessarily outlaw abortion. Unless Roe is overturned, the Court
would have to consider the extent to which recognition of preborn “personhood” restricts Roe’s
acknowledgment of women’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. See also Carter, supra
note 28, at 307 (discussing the appropriateness of using the democratic process to resolve the abortion
debate, and citing In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. 1992) for the proposition
that the initiative process “was never intended to be a vehicle for amending the United States
Constitution nor can it serve that function in our system of government”).
33
What is Personhood, supra note 29 (stating that “to be a person is to be protected by a series of
God-given rights and constitutional guarantees such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This
terrifies the pro-abortion foes! They know that if we clearly define the preborn baby as a person, they
will have the same right to life as all Americans do.”).
34
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently vetoed personhood language similar to that which
was proposed in Colorado in 2012. See Randy Krehbiel, Group Requests Personhood Appeal from
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
TULSA
WORLD ,
July
31,
2012,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printerfriendlystory.aspx?articleid=20120731_16_a9_clrdae519381
(expressing Personhood USA’s hope that the United States Supreme Court will use the dispute
surrounding Oklahoma’s proposed personhood amendment as an opportunity to overturn Casey [and
thereby Roe]). The United States Supreme Court has since denied certiorari in the case. In re Initiative
No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012), cert. denied, Personhood Okla. v.
Barber, 133 S. Ct. 528 (2012).
35
Over twenty years ago, a statute regulating abortions was introduced in Missouri that included
a preamble stating that “‘[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,’ and that ‘unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.’” Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 501 (1988) (quoting M O. R EV. STAT . § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)). But unlike modern
personhood proposals, the Missouri statute expressly subordinates itself to Supreme Court precedent,
including Roe, and because the statute had not been used to restrict women’s rights in violation of
Roe, when the statute was challenged, the Court determined that it did not have to pass upon the
constitutionality of the preamble. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.
36
Adam Cayton-Holland, Meet Kristi Burton, The 21-Year-Old Pro-Lifer Behind The
Personhood Amendment, WESTWORD NEWS, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.westword.com/2008-0925/news/meet-kristi-burton-the-22-year-old-pro-lifer-behind-the-personhood-amendment/.
37
Leslie Jorgensen, Personhood Amendment Revised and Revived, C OLORADO STATESMAN , July
3, 2009, http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991130-personhood-amendment-revised-andrevived.
38
See supra note 19; see infra Appendix I. This discussion is focused on efforts by states to
avoid specifically mentioning abortion by defining the term “person” to include the preborn through
statute or constitutional amendment.
39
For the relevant text of Missouri’s preamble, see supra note 35.
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Specifically, proposed Amendment 48 sought to add a new section to the
Colorado Constitution that would have simply read “Section 31. Person defined. As
used in sections 3, 6, and 25 of article II of the state constitution, the terms ‘person’
or ‘persons’ shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization.” 40
Although seventy-three percent of the Colorado electorate voted against this
proposal, the day after the vote, Keith Mason founded Personhood USA to continue
the effort.41
Personhood USA is a national organization with many regional affiliates 42 that
identifies itself as a non-profit Christian ministry that “serves the pro-life community
by assisting local groups to initiate citizen, legislative, and political action focusing
on the ultimate goal of the pro-life movement: personhood rights for all innocent
humans.”43 Among other things, the organization is committed to “moving churches
and the culture to make the dehumanization and murdering of preborn children
unthinkable.”44 Some have suggested that the Personhood Movement is simply about
returning to first principles, 45 and Personhood USA itself is very specific: the
movement is about “working to respect the God-given right to life recognizing all
human beings as persons who are ‘created in the image of God’ from the beginning
of their biological development, without exceptions.” 46 This language expressly
adopts a thin, biological definition of life and personhood, 47 and there is nothing on
its face limiting its applicability to abortion.
Although the position is subject to challenge as being inappropriately speciesest,
proponents maintain that the only criterion relevant to assigning the protections
associated with legal personhood is membership in the Homo sapiens species. 48
After all, under the revised language every human being is a “person,” and human
beings include “every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of
development.”49 The Sanctity of Human Life Act similarly states that “human being”
includes “every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at all stages of life.” 50

40

See Colo. Initiative 36 (2008) (proposed C OLO . C ONST. art II, § 23), available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2007 -2008/Final36-0708.pdf.
41
Abigail Pesta, Behind ‘Personhood’ Leader Keith Mason’s Anti-Abortion Crusade,
NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2012), http://mag.newsweek.com/2012/06/24/personhood-usa-s-keith-masoneyes-election-day-2012.html.
42
See, e.g., C OLO . PERSONHOOD COALITION , http://personhoodco.com (last visited Oct. 20,
2013); PERSONHOOD FLA., http://personhoodfl.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD M ISS.,
http://www.personhoodmississippi.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD N.D.,
http://personhoodnorthdakota.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD OKLA.,
http://personhoodoklahoma.com/news (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD WIS.,
http://www.personhoodwisconsin.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
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See About Personhood, supra note 31.
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Id.
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THE 21 ST C ENTURY AND THE RETURN TO FIRST P RINCIPLES IN P OLITICS (2011).
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About Personhood, supra note 31.
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See supra note 4 and infra note 178.
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E.g., Jonathan Will et al., When Potential Does Not Matter: What Developments in Cellular
Biology Tell Us About the Concept of Legal Personhood, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 38, 39 (2013) (citing
generally to PETER SINGER , ANIMAL LIBERATION : A NEW E THICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
(1975)). Under this view, the belief that human life should be protected because it is innately valuable
or “sacred just in itself” is detached from any requirement that the life in quest ion has interests of its
own. RONALD DWORKIN , LIFE ’S DOMINION 11-13 (1993).
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See infra Appendix I.
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Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. § 3(3) (Jan. 2013).
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Further, proponents are clear that for them membership in the species begins at the
outset of biological development. 51
This approach stands in contrast to other ways in which we might define legal or
moral personhood. For instance, one might agree with the human species concept,
yet maintain that membership does not occur until a later time in development, such
as the appearance of the primitive streak around fourteen days after fertilization, 52 or
when other evidence of “life” is present like a detectable heartbeat (five to six
weeks) 53 or electrical activity in the early brain (eight weeks). 54 One could also
assign legal or moral personhood to a pre-embryo55 not because of its current state,
but because it has the potential to develop into a born human being. 56 Yet another
approach rejects the significance of membership in the Homo sapiens species, and
instead would attach legal or moral personhood at the point when the developing
organism attains certain capacities, such as the capacity to experience pain 57 or for
rational thought or self-consciousness. 58 Interestingly, one could try to identify fetal
viability as the person-defining criterion using any of these approaches. For instance,
membership in the species could be deemed to begin at viability; or a fetus mi ght be
considered to have sufficient potential of becoming a born human at the point of
viability such that it is then worthy of legal protection; or, as the Supreme Court
noted in Roe, one could say that at viability the fetus has the capacity for
51
See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the biology of early human
development). The argument generally raised in support of this position is that once the egg and sperm
have united, a unique genetic human being exists. CYNTHIA B. C OHEN , R ENEWING THE STUFF OF LIFE:
STEM C ELLS, E THICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-67 (2007) (identifying and critiquing this position).
52
C OHEN, supra note 51, at 68.
53
David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 14043 (2013). The heart may begin to beat as early as twenty-two days after fertilization. Kirsten Rabe
Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An Introduction to the Forced Symmetry
Approach, 2006 U. C HI. LEGAL F. 41, 81 n.200 (citing WILLIAM J. LARSEN , HUMAN E MBRYOLOGY
166 (2001)).
54
Smolensky, supra note 53, at 69-70.
55
“Pre-embryo” will be the term used throughout this paper to refer to the fertilized ovum from
the time the sperm penetrates the egg until roughly two weeks later wh en the primitive streak develops
and/or implantation is complete. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992) (detailing
scientific justification for distinguishing between the terms “embryo” and “pre -embryo”). Not all
commentators support making this terminological distinction. See, e.g., Louis M. Guenin, On
Classifying the Developing Organism, 36 C ONN. L. R EV. 1115 (2004) (arguing that these distinctions
do not add value to moral discussions regarding such things as embryonic stem cell researc h). Cf. Ann
A. Kiessling, What is an Embryo?, 36 C ONN. L. R EV. 1051 (2004) (arguing that use of the technical
terms informs our understanding of the morality of these activities).
56
See, e.g., C OHEN , supra note 51, at 73-78; Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert, The
Argument from Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally ‘Depotentialized’?, 13 AM. J.
B IOETHICS 19 (2013) (identifying and critiquing this position); Will et al., supra note 48 (discussing
arguments from potentiality and how any determination of when there is sufficient “potential” to
warrant legal protection is subject to a charge of arbitrariness).
57
See I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39
J.L. M ED. & E THICS 235, 240 (2011) (identifying and challenging the argument “that the capacity to
feel pain is itself a criterion of constitutional personhood” that could be raised in defense of
Nebraska’s statute outlawing abortion at twenty-weeks’ gestation).
58
C OHEN, supra note 51, at 81-83 (identifying and critiquing this position). Peter Singer is well
known for his support of this position, which is willing to assign personhood to certain high functioning, non-human species while withholding the designation from certain low-functioning
humans. Id. (citing generally to PETER SINGER , PRACTICAL E THICS (1993)). See also John A.
Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. R EV. 437, 444-46 (1990)
(noting the difference between the human species approach and the capacity approach). Proponents of
the Personhood Movement obviously reject any notion that sentience or conscious experience is a
prerequisite to attaching moral worth and full legal protection to the human life in question.
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“meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,”59 so as to make the State’s interest in
protecting fetal life compelling at that point.
In an interesting article, Jessica Berg outlines a different kind of personhood
framework60 where she suggests that a claim to the protections of legal personhood
in the context of the non-sentient (those without interests or consciousness) must be
based not on the entity’s own interests (since it has none), but on the protection of
interests of others.61 She further argues that legal protection of the non-sentient may
be more limited than that afforded to persons with interests. 62
By way of example, Professor Berg points out that at birth, the law currently
protects the life of even non-sentient human beings, such as an anencephalic infant
who lacks the cortical structures necessary for consciousness, not because the
anencephalic infant herself has a claim to protection of her own interests, but
“because there is a societal interest in encouraging specific caring behaviors towards
all infants (and discouraging other behaviors such as infanticide).” 63 This is
important since, at least in part, the suggestion could be made that because
anencephalic infants appear very much like newborn babies with normal cortical
function, a societal interest exists in protecting them as legal persons
notwithstanding their lack of their own interests. 64 Another example can be seen in
Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court references Congress’ statement that permitting
partial-birth abortions in the second trimester (at which point the fetus has
recognizably human features) would “further coarsen society to the humanity of not
only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly
difficult to protect such life.” 65 But the same would arguably not be true for the
entity existing very early in biological development (say a single-celled zygote,
which does not appear to share many characteristics with a newborn person), and
this may suggest that the interests of others would not be sufficient at this earlier
stage to protect this non-sentient entity as a legal person. 66
But those in support of the Personhood Movement would counter that society
has a sufficient interest in acknowledging the value of and offering protection to all
members of the Homo sapiens species without regard to sentience. In fact, the
devaluing of what is considered to be human life (by not protecting it) is considered
by personhood proponents to be a great detriment to societal interests. 67 How early
in the developmental process the Court would acknowledge such a societal or stateasserted interest is unclear. But in this regard, it is interesting to note that the
Personhood Movement appears (even if inadvertently) to be taking Justice Rehnquist
up on his suggestion in Cruzan (in the end-of-life context) that States “may properly
decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular person may
enjoy and may simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
59

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
Berg, supra note 1, at 375-79.
Id. at 376; cf. DWORKIN , supra note 48, at 11-13 (describing the “detached objection to
abortion,” which is a claim against abortion based on the belief that human life has intrinsic value
regardless of whether the human has its own interests).
62
Berg, supra note 1, at 376. It is on this point that Personhood proponents would surely
disagree.
63
Id. at 378.
64
Id. at 387.
65
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
66
Berg, supra note 1, at 391. John Robertson has argued that pre-embryos are owed special
(though not full) protection based on their potential to become human, and because they are symbols
of human life. Robertson, supra note 58, at 446-48.
67
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
60
61
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life.”68 In a sense then, personhood efforts seem to support the claim made by Justice
Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan, that when a state asserts such an
unqualified interest in protecting life (even in the end-of-life context), it is really “an
effort to define life, rather than to protect it.”69
The Personhood Movement, at its core, is about adopting a “thin,” unqualified,
and biological definition of personhood that would attach full moral status and legal
protection to the life of the preborn and place them on equal footing with the born,70
and in 2010 Personhood USA successfully placed another citizen-driven
constitutional amendment on the ballot in Colorado. 71 The language the second time
around was slightly different. 72 The 2010 version was intended to apply to the same
constitutional provisions, but this time the proposed amendment stated that the terms
“person” or “persons” shall apply “to every human being from the beginning of the
biological development of that human being.” 73 Here the term fertilization was
removed, and the stated reason for this change was to broaden the scope to make
sure that the provision included any persons created through asexual reproduction,
like cloning. 74 As occurred in 2008, 75 opponents of the 2010 measure raised
concerns that the proposal would have impacts on contraception, fertility treatments,
and the medical treatment of pregnant women. 76 These concerns were publicly
labeled as scare tactics by Personhood USA, 77 but although the language of the
initiative was different, the result was the same, with the Colorado electorate voting
against the 2010 proposed amendment by a margin of three to one. 78 After
resounding defeats in Colorado, 79 Personhood USA directed its efforts at arguably

68

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
Id. at 344 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70
See infra Parts III & IV for the implications of such a framework.
71
Colo. Initiative 25 (2010) (proposed C OLO . C ONST. art II, § 23), available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs//elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2009 -2010/25Final.pdf.
72
Compare id. with Colo. Initiative 36 (2008) (proposed C OLO . C ONST . art II, § 23), available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2007-2008/Final36-0708.pdf.
73
Colo. Initiative 25 (proposed C OLO . CONST . art II, § 23).
74
Jorgenson, supra note 37. See also Dianne N. Irving, Problems with Colorado’s “Personhood”
Amendment: The Phrase, “From the Moment of Fertilization,” LIFE ISSUES.NET (May 31, 2008),
http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_126colorado.html (suggesting that the term “fertilization”
would not encompass naturally occurring twinning or the use of cloning).
75
Draper, supra note 18.
76
Electa Draper, “Personhood” Amendment Fails by 3-1 Margin, DENVER POST , Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.denverpost.com/election2010/ci_16506253.
77
Jorgenson, supra note 37.
78
Id. Interestingly, far less money was raised in campaign efforts the second time aroun d. In
2008, supporters of Amendment 48 raised over $350,000, while opponents raised in excess of $1.8
million, but in 2010 those numbers were down to around $50,000 and $578,000, respectively. Id.;
Draper, supra note 75.
79
In 2010 an Alaskan citizen proposed an amendment to existing state legislation that sought to
“protect the natural right to life and body of all mankind from the beginning of biological
development,” and stated that “the natural right to life and body of the unborn child supercedes [sic]
the statutory right of the mother to consent to the injury or death of her unborn child. ” Alaska Natural
Right to Life Initiative (2011) (proposed ALASKA C ONST . art I, § 18.01), available at
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/10NRTL/10NRTL_Sponsor_Language.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2013). Alaska’s Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative after determining that he was
“convinced the controlling case law [including Roe] made [the initiative] clearly unconstitutional,”
because both the Alaska and Federal Constitutions protect a woman ’s right to privacy. Pat Forgey,
State Rejects
Anti-Abortion
Ballot
Measure, JUNEAU EMPIRE
(Jan. 12, 2011),
http://juneauempire.com/stories/011211/loc_768878153.shtml. For a discussion of legislative efforts
in Georgia, Louisiana, and North Dakota targeted more directly at reproductive technologies, see infra
Part IV.
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the most conservative state in the Union 80 in the 2011 election cycle. 81
B. PERSONHOOD GOES TO MISSISSIPPI
Like Colorado’s Constitution, the Mississippi Constitution can be amended by
citizen initiative 82 and, if it had passed, Measure 26 would have amended the Bill of
Rights of the Mississippi Constitution to define the term “person” or “persons” to
“include every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the
functional equivalent thereof.”83
Unlike in Colorado, where pre-election polling in both 2008 84 and 2010 85
foretold the defeat of personhood initiatives there, some initial reports in Mississippi
showed an excess of eighty percent of the electorate in favor of Measure 26. 86
Indeed, candidates running for office on both the Republican and Democratic
tickets—including both candidates for Governor—expressed open support for the
amendment. 87 As the election neared, however, support within the populace began to
wane, and on November 8, 2011, Measure 26 failed with nearly fifty-eight percent
of the electorate voting against it. 88
Immediately after the election, analysts began the work of determining what
caused such an unexpected collapse. 89 One commentator identified several possible
reasons for the failure.90 For one, the language was poorly drafted, 91 and its inherent

80
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Mississippi Rates as the Most Conservative U.S. State, GALLUP
POLITICS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146348/mississippi-rates-conservativestate.aspx.
81
See generally Jonathan F. Will, Measure 26: Fear Mongering, Self-Execution & Potential
Implications for Birth Control, 81 M ISS. L.J. SUPRA 63 (2011) [hereinafter Will, Measure 26]
(describing personhood efforts in Mississippi).
82
M ISS. C ONST . art XV, § 273.
83
Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed M ISS. C ONST . art. III, § 33), available at
http://www.sos.ms.gov/initiatives/Definition%20of%20Person -PW%20Revised.pdf.
84
Bente Birkeland, ‘Personhood’ Amendment on Colorado Ballot, NPR (Oct. 29, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96167092.
85
Steven Ertelt, Second Poll: Colorado Personhood Amendment Likely to Lose, LIVE NEWS. COM
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.lifenews.com/2010/10/25/state-5601/.
86
Peter Roff, Mississippi Voters May Change Abortion Debate, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2011/10/14/mississippi-voters-may-change-abortiondebate.
87
Id.
88
M ISS. SEC’Y OF STATE , OFFICIAL TABULATION OF VOTE FOR STATEWIDE INITIATIVE M EASURE
NO.
26
(2011),
http://www.sos.ms.gov/links/elections/results/statewide/Statewide%20Initiative%20Measure%2026%
20-%20General%20Election%202011%20Results.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). In March of 2013,
Ann Reed submitted a new personhood proposal to the Mississippi Secretary of State that would
amend the state constitution by adding a new section that would read: “The right to life begins at
conception. All human beings at every stage of development are unique, created in the image of God,
and shall enjoy the inalienable right to life as persons under the law.” Meet the Sponsor, PERSONHOOD
M ISS. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.personhoodmississippi.com/home-featured/meet-the-sponsor-of-thelife-at-conception-citizens-intiative/.
89
See Mississippi Anti-Abortion ‘Personhood’ Amendment Fails at Ballot Box, WASH . POST,
Nov.
9,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mississippi-anti-abortion-personhoodamendment-fails-at-ballot-box/2011/11/09/gIQAzQl95M_story.html.
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Burns Strider, 6 Reasons Mississippians Said No to “Personhood” Amendment, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/burns-strider/personhood-amendment_b_1083079.html.
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Id.
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ambiguities 92 saw the same concerns previously seen in Colorado raised regarding
potential impacts on the treatment of pregnant women, restrictions on contraception,
and restrictions on IVF. 93 In addition, major religious figures, like Episcopal,
Methodist, and Catholic Bishops in Mississippi did not support the measure, nor did
the president of the Mississippi NAACP. 94 Interestingly, while outgoing Governor
Haley Barbour ultimately voted in favor of the initiative, he first publicly voiced his
concerns about it. 95 Finally, Personhood USA faced stauncher opposition in
conservative Mississippi than it may have anticipated. 96 Local groups like
Mississippians for Healthy Families 97 and Parents Against 2698 organized efforts in
opposition to the amendment, which reached thousands of citizens.99
For its part, Personhood USA performed exit polling in an attempt to discover
what caused the unanticipated defeat in Mississippi. 100 The poll suggested that the
amendment’s failure could not be attributed to a large group of previouslyunidentified abortion-rights voters in Mississippi; rather, only 8% of the ten
thousand people polled indicated that they voted against the measure because they
identify themselves as “pro-choice.” 101 A greater percentage (12%) said that they
voted against Measure 26 because then-Governor Haley Barbour expressed concerns
about it. 102 But the two most common reasons indicated for voting against the
initiative had to do with potential implications for (a) the medical treatment of
pregnant women (28%), and (b) the availability of IVF (31%). 103
When reporting the results of this polling, Personhood USA noted that
proponents of Measure 26 had repeatedly said that “the amendment could not ban in
vitro fertilization, contraception, or healthcare for women,” but that “Planned
Parenthood (under the guise of Mississippians for Healthy Families), persisted in
lying to Mississippi voters, propagating scare tactics that were proven false
numerous times.”104 From Personhood USA’s perspective, the poll made clear that

92

See I. Glenn Cohen & Jonathan F. Will, Op-Ed, Mississippi’s Ambiguous ‘Personhood’
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/mississippisambiguous-personhood-amendment.html.
93
See, e.g., Elizabeth Crisp, Mississippians to Vote on ‘Personhood’ Initiative, USA TODAY ,
Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-06/mississippi-voters-to-vote-onpersonhood-initiative/51098740/1; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 64; Jonathan F. Will, Op-Ed,
Life and Law—The Commitment to Pre-Embryonic Personhood, MISS. B US. J. (Sep. 23, 2011),
http://msbusiness.com/2011/09/op-ed-life-and-law-%E2%80%94%C2%A0the-commitment-to-preembryonic-personhood/ [hereinafter Will, Life and Law]. In addition to writing on the topic, I
organized a panel at Mississippi College School of Law to discuss the amendment and its potential
implications. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
94
Strider, supra note 90.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Personhood USA was adamant that Mississippians for Healthy Families was a front for
Planned Parenthood and the ACLU. See Live Action and Personhood USA Release New Sting
Operation
in
Mississippi
Before
Personhood
Vote,
PRWEB
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/10/prweb8924956.htm.
98
See generally PARENTS AGAINST MS 26, http://parentsagainstms26.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).
99
Strider, supra note 90.
100
Keith Ashley, New Poll Reveals Real Reason Behind Mississippi Personhood Loss,
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“Planned Parenthood’s willful deceit, which also raised doubts in the mind of
Governor Haley Barbour, caused the defeat of [Measure] 26.”105
In response to Planned Parenthood’s perceived lies, Personhood USA drastically
revised the language to be used in future personhood efforts. 106 In Mason’s own
words, the “new personhood language prevents those falsehoods by making it
absolutely clear what the amendment can and cannot do—while still protecting
every child from his or her earliest stages.” 107 In order to fully appreciate the
revisions made, 108 and how “absolutely clear”109 they really are, it is first necessary
to understand the nature of the debates in Mississippi to provide context to the
broader debates concerning personhood. As it turns out, not all of the proponents of
Measure 26 were consistent in what they believed the amendment could and could
not (or should and should not) do.
III. DEBATING PERSONHOOD
There were two primary and related questions that drove most of the discussions
surrounding Measure 26 leading up to the vote: (1) what would (or could) happen
immediately after the amendment became effective were it to pass; and (2) what
impact, if any, would the amendment have on (a) the treatment of pregnant women
(as well as those suffering miscarriages), (b) contraception, and (c) IVF.110
A. IMMEDIATE IMPACT
The immediate legal impact that Measure 26 would (or could) have had was
never clear, in part because the language of the amendment was silent in this
regard. 111 For instance, it is possible that as soon as the amendment became
effective, thousands of references in the Mississippi Code to “person” or “persons,”
including in homicide statutes, would have needed to be understood to include every
human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the functional equiva lent
thereof. In such a case, Measure 26 would have been effectively self-executing,
since no enabling legislation would have been needed to set it in motion. 112 Abortion
becomes immediately problematic, because the existing statutory framework
includes laws criminalizing the intentional killing of persons. Indeed, any loss of life
105

Id.
See, e.g., Electa Draper, Personhood USA Again Pushes for Right-to-Life Amendment to
Colorado Constitution, DENVER POST, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_19387552
(noting that similar efforts would be pursued in Oregon and Montana); Stephanie Samuel , New Colo.
Personhood Amendment Features New, Improved Language, CHRISTIAN POST , Nov. 22, 2011,
http://www.christianpost.com/news/new-colo-personhood-amendment-features-new-improvedlanguage-62627/.
107
Samuel, supra note 106.
108
See infra Appendix I for the text of the new language that was proposed in Colorado. Part III
briefly outlines the central debates in Mississippi, and also introduces the revisions made to the
personhood language in response thereto. Part IV then discusses in detail the revisions pertaining to
contraception and IVF, and why those revisions do not adequately address the primary concerns raised
regarding reproductive choice.
109
Samuel, supra note 106.
110
See generally Cohen & Will, supra note 92; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81; Will, Life and
Law, supra note 93 (discussing these questions). The University of Mississippi School of Law
published a useful symposium related to Measure 26. Mississippi Personhood and Initiative 26
Symposium,
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M ISS.
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(2011),
available
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of these newly recognized persons could be investigated and prosecuted using the
existing statutory framework. 113
On the other hand, it is also possible that the amendment would have been
interpreted to require enabling legislation to set it in motion, in which case, the
amendment itself would have had no immediate impact (on abortion or
otherwise).114 Under this scenario, after passage, discussions would have been held
regarding what the enabling legislation should look like, and certainly an antiabortion statute would have been expected. 115 But supporters of Measure 26 did not
express consistent positions regarding whether the amendment was intended to be
effectively self-executing. 116
For instance, some proponents of the amendment suggested that Measure 26
merely set forth constitutional principles, and that it would need enabling
legislation.117 At a symposium hosted by Mississippi College School of Law that I
helped to organize in advance of the November election, the General Counsel of
Liberty Counsel, which defended Measure 26 in legal challenges in Mississippi
courts, suggested that the proposed amendment would require enabling legislation to
be effective; however, at the same symposium, a national spokeswoman for
Personhood USA indicated that she believed that after the amendment became
effective, local prosecutors would immediately be permitted to decide whether to
conduct investigations involving the loss of life of these newly recognized
persons.118
As Professor Borgmann pointed out, many supporters of Measure 26, who
thought they were voting on an abortion ban, may have been surprised if the
amendment passed and yet had no immediate impact. 119 And because Measure 26
failed, the Mississippi Supreme Court never had to address the question of whether,
under state law, the amendment would have been effectively self-executing. In
response to the uncertainty raised in Mississippi on this issue, the revised
personhood language that was proposed in Colorado and elsewhere explicitly states
that “all provisions [of the amendment] are self-executing and are severable.”120
The significance of this position should not be lost. With no need for legislation
to be enacted, these proponents seem to be suggesting that no discussion need be had
113
Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 70-74; see also Deborah Bell, Disputes Over Frozen
Embryos, 81 M ISS. L.J. SUPRA 105, 113 (2011) (suggesting that courts, when confronted with disputes
over dispositions of embryos, would be unlikely to ignore the “strong statement of policy” contained
in Measure 26 when determining how to apply existing law).
114
See Christopher R. Green, A Textual Analysis of the Possible Impact of Measure 26 on the
Mississippi Bill of Rights, 81 M ISS. L.J. SUPRA 39, 41 (2011) (considering whether Measure 26 could
have outlawed abortion in Mississippi on its own).
115
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116
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117
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“Life,” 81 M ISS. L.J. SUPRA 115, 117 (2011); see also Memorandum from the Liberty Counsel to the
Personhood Amendment Physicians’ Working Grp. & Other Interested Parties 1 (Sep. 17, 2011),
http://yeson26.net/media/2455/personhoodphysiciansworkinggroupcivillawmemo.pdf.
118
Stephen Crampton & Rebecca Kiessling, Address at the Mississippi College School of Law
Symposium: Amendment 26—Exploring the Implications of Mississippi’s Personhood Initiative (Oct.
25, 2011). For descriptions of panelists’ comments, see Debating Mississippi’s “Personhood
Amendment,”
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NEWS,
Oct.
26,
2011,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_16220126236/debating-mississippis-personhood-amendment/; Valerie Wells, Personhood: A Pandora’s
Box,
JACKSON
FREE
PRESS,
Nov.
2,
2011,
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by elected officials regarding the nature and scope of the amendment. Rather than
subsequent political discussion defining the impact of the amendment on such things
as abortion, the treatment of pregnant women, contraception or IVF, the amendment
itself would dictate that the existing statutory framework is capable of dealing with
these issues taking into account the new definition of the term “person.”121 Just as
abortion would immediately become problematic, so too would the treatment of
pregnant women, contraception, and IVF that involve the death of newly recognized
persons. The existing statutory framework would treat these deaths just like any
other loss of human life.
That said, the amendment’s identifying itself as self-executing would not likely
end the inquiry. When this revised language was recently introduced in Arkansas,
the attorney general noted in his opinion rejecting the proposal that, given the
changes that would be needed to the Arkansas Code if the proposal were to pass, the
amendment could not be self-executing. 122 Whether a given personhood amendment
could be self-executing is a matter of individual state law 123 an exploration of
which is beyond the scope of this article. The revised language, however, makes
clear that certain proponents have officially taken the position that they intend these
amendments to have an immediate impact should they pass without further political
discourse.
A different approach was taken recently in North Dakota. There, the State
Senate approved a personhood initiative to amend the state constitution to add a very
short statement protecting human life at any stage of development; 124 however, a
piece of enabling legislation (S.B. 2302) dealing with such things as birth control
and IVF was simultaneously proposed in the Senate to take effect if the
constitutional amendment is approved by the citizens of North Dakota. 125 While S.B.
2302 was struck down by the Senate, since the constitutional initiative was approved
by the House, it will appear on the ballot in 2014. 126 And if the constitutional
amendment passes, the North Dakota legislature is likely to revisit the implications
for birth control and IVF. 127
But if adoption of a personhood amendment is intended to have an immediate
impact on the existing statutory framework without the need for enabling legislation,
as it could in some states, what would that mean for the treatment of pregnant
women, contraception, and IVF (question two from above)? Part IV of this article
will focus on implications for reproductive choice, including contraception and IVF,
but a few words on the treatment of pregnant women and miscarriages are in order.
121
Further, certain existing laws pertaining to the preborn would become redundant at best, or
unconstitutional at worst. There would be no need for specific feticide statutes, because fetuses would
be treated no differently (save for proposed exceptions in the personhood amendment itself) than any
other person. In fact, to treat the death of a fetus differently could raise equal protection issues under
the Fourteenth Amendment, just as it would if we treated the death of toddlers differently than that of
teenagers or adults. It would seem to be a violation of the equal protection of the toddler if the law
were written to say that the unintentional killing of a toddler is not prohibited, or that the killing of a
toddler is punishable by a maximum of only two years in p rison. This is not to say that the Court
would be precluded from determining that a fetus is sufficiently different than a born person so as to
permit different treatment.
122
Ark. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 19.
123
See generally Will, Measure 26, supra note 81.
124
See Bassett, Senate, supra note 21.
125
See S.B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb., § 13 (N.D. 2013), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-8231-02000.pdf?20130213153739.
126
Bassett, House, supra note 21.
.
127
See infra Parts III & IV.
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B. TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND MISCARRIAGES
With regard to treating pregnant women, the question pertains to whether
recognizing fertilized ova (however fertilization is to be defined)128 as having the
same legal status as pregnant women restricts the treatment options available for
pregnant women. The most common concern raised in the media in particular by
physicians involved the treatment of women with ectopic or molar pregnancies,
which can prove life-threatening for pregnant women, and necessarily requires
termination of the pregnancies.129 Some suggested that treating pregnant women in
such cases could lead to civil or criminal penalties if Measure 26 were to pass. 130
Perhaps not surprisingly, those within the Personhood Movement labeled such
concerns as false information and scare tactics. 131 Dr. Freda Bush, a vocal
personhood proponent and Mississippi obstetrician, was comfortable that existing
Mississippi laws would protect physicians treating pregnant women in emergency
situations, but Dr. Paul Seago, a gynecologic oncologist in the State Capital, was
concerned about treatments for women with cancer, many of which would endanger
the fetus. 132 At the time, Keith Mason’s wife Jennifer, who serves as the
communications director of Personhood USA, conceded that abortion would not be
permitted for women with cancer.133
In Mississippi, certain statutes dealing with justifiable 134 or excusable 135
homicide would arguably have been available to defend physicians treating pregnant
women in these circumstances. 136 The United States Supreme Court has also
referenced the principle of double effect when considering situations in which death
occurs as a foreseen though unintended consequence of otherwise permissible
activity.137 “Out of an abundance of caution,” however, Liberty Counsel suggested in
a legal memorandum pertaining to Measure 26, that it would be “in favor of enabling
legislation explicitly providing immunity to medical professionals who
unintentionally caused the injury or death to the unborn child during treatment of the
mother for an ectopic pregnancy or other life-threatening situations, as well as those
128

See infra Part IV.
See Rob Mank, Doctors Call Mississippi “Personhood” Initiative Dangerous, CBS NEWS,
Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57318625-503544/doctors-call-mississippipersonhood-initiative-dangerous/ (discussing ectopic pregnancies (those where implantation occurs
outside the uterus), and molar pregnancies (where the fertilized egg becomes an abnormal growth
instead of a fetus), each of which will not lead to successful pregnancies, but can cause the woman to
bleed to death or suffer other “dire consequences”).
130
Laura Bassett, Mississippi ‘Personhood’ Law Could Cause Legal Mayhem, Experts Warn,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/07/mississippipersonhood-la_n_1079710.html.
131
Denise Grady, Medical Nuances Drove ‘No’ Vote in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/health/policy/no-vote-in-mississippi-hinged-on-issues-beyondabortion.html?pagewanted=all.
132
Id.
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Id.
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M ISS. C ODE ANN . § 97-3-15 (West 2011).
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Id. § 97-3-17.
136
See Geroge S. Whitten, Jr. & Jameson Taylor, Personhood Amendment Will Not Change
Legal Safeguards for Physicians Providing Necessary Treatment to Pregnant Patients , M ISS. C TR.
FOR P UB. P OL’ Y, http://www.mspolicy.com/downloads/Initiative26Analysis.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
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See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808 n.11 (1997) (noting that informed consent and the
principle of double effect could be utilized by a state to permit palliative care specifically
referencing terminal sedation “which may have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ of
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involved with in vitro fertilization who do not recklessly or intentionally destroy
living human beings.”138
Of course, if the personhood amendments now being proposed are selfexecuting, then no enabling legislation is needed. Since this means that the scope of,
or exceptions to, the amendment would not need to be delineated by subsequent
legislation, as a matter of immediacy, any limitations on the language should be
included in the amendment itself. After the failure of Measure 26 then, Personhood
USA went ahead and revised the language to include certain exceptions. 139
Specifically, the new language states that while “the intentional140 killing of any
innocent person is prohibited . . . medical treatment for life threatening physical
conditions intended to preserve life shall not be affected by this section,” where such
medical treatment includes, but is not limited to, “treatment for cancer, ectopic and
molar pregnancy, twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome, and placenta previa.”141 “Lifethreatening” is not defined in these revisions, 142 which creates lingering questions.
For instance, it is unclear whether termination of a pregnancy would be permissible
if a woman with cancer could potentially survive without chemotherapy until the
fetus became viable (followed by a Caesarian section, as suggested by Jennifer
Mason). 143 For purposes here, it is sufficient to note that personhood proponents
have at least attempted to add some immediate protection for physicians treating
pregnant women given that the amendment is intended to have an instant impact if
passed.144
It is also worth mentioning the concerns identified regarding women
experiencing miscarriages. Under a personhood framework a miscarriage results in
the death of a person, and normally, loss of human life is followed by an
investigation into the cause, regardless of whether charges ultimately get filed. 145
Personhood proponents identified these concerns as the further use of scare tactics,
and Dr. Freda Bush suggested that police would not have time for such “witch
hunts.”146 Personhood USA’s poll did not indicate that investigation of miscarriages
was a prominent reason for the defeat of Measure 26, 147 but nevertheless, the new
personhood language includes the statement that “spontaneous miscarriages shall not
138

Memorandum from Liberty Counsel, supra note 117, at 5. For more on IVF see infra Parts III

and IV.
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See infra Appendix I.
Intent is not defined. It may be that the amendment itself solely implicates situations where
there is a “determination” to kill (specific intent), but in the criminal context in particular, general
intent can take “the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking
of that risk) or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence).” B LACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 881-82
(9th ed. 2009). This is important given our awareness of the risks associated with taking certain forms
of birth control or undertaking certain procedures in IVF. See infra Part IV. Even if the amendment
itself is considered not to immediately impact certain activities or circumstances (due to a lack of
specific intent) it at least creates a framework in which subsequent restrictions could be enacted by
proponents wishing to remain consistent with the personhood position. See infra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text.
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Raphael Romo, Dominican Republic Abortion Ban Stops Treatment for Pregnant Teen with Cancer,
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be affected by this section,” where “spontaneous miscarriage” is defined as “the
unintentional termination of a pregnancy.”148
Because miscarriage is here defined in terms of pregnancy, the revision may
reflect the common understanding that naturally-occurring fertilization is generally
undetectable until the implantation process is complete, which is commonly
considered to mark the onset of pregnancy. 149 This may suggest that there should be
no investigation into the greater than fifty percent of fertilized ova that are naturally
expelled from a woman prior to implantation, 150 notwithstanding the fact that under
a personhood framework, a human life has been lost.
But beyond this, the revision does not address the normative problem, which is
whether under a personhood framework, women known to be pregnant who
experience miscarriages would (or ought) be investigated in connection with that
loss of human life. After all, how would the intent with which the pregnancy was
terminated be determined save for an investigation? A pregnant woman may look
forward to parenthood, but may continue to take narcotics during pregnancy because
she is addicted. Any miscarriage would appear to be unintentional (at least lacking
specific intent), and perhaps spontaneous under the revised language. Or she may
specifically intend that the drug use will lead to the termination of her pregnancy.
Even if the authorities, after inquiry, plan to take her word regarding intent, an
investigation would seem quite necessary. Importantly, whether such investigation
would lead to a prosecution is a separate, but related question.
The issue of drug use during pregnancy raises another problem with the revised
language that I will identify here but leave for others to address. Imagine a situation
where a state has a statute that permits a woman to be prosecuted and sent to prison
for twenty years if she has a miscarriage (even if unintentional) caused by drug
use. 151 Or consider Rennie Gibbs who, without regard to any personhood
amendment, was charged in 2011 with depraved-heart murder in Mississippi 152 when
she experienced a stillbirth at thirty-six weeks gestation, and it was discovered that
she had a cocaine habit.153 If these miscarriages were determined to be unintentional,
would such prosecutions be permissible if a state constitutional provision provided
that any unintentional termination of pregnancy is not prohibited by the amendment
itself?
It is unlikely that a drug-induced miscarriage would be considered acceptable by
personhood proponents under the revised personhood language regardless of
whether the woman intended for the pregnancy to terminate. 154 In response to
148
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See Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in
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pregnancy. C OHEN, supra note 51, at 65.
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152
M ISS. C ODE ANN . § 97-3-19 (West 2011).
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Murder Charges, GUARDIAN , June 24, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/24/americapregnant-women-murder-charges. After initially accepting an interlocutory appeal to decide the issue,
the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that Ms. Gibbs would have to stand trial before the Court
would determine whether the law applied to pregnant women. See Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-IA-00819SCT, Order No. 172566 (Miss. Oct. 27, 2011) (order dismissing interlocutory appeal), available at
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad149

592

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. 39 NO. 4 2013

Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute, Ben Dupré, the director of Personhood
Alabama, was quoted as saying that “I think it would be unequal protection to give
the woman a pass when anyone else who injects drugs into a child would be
prosecuted.”155 One critic of Alabama’s statute suggested that it is a “personhood
measure in disguise.”156
Perhaps then, Personhood USA intends that while the amendments themselves
may not be considered to prohibit unintentional miscarriages, existing statutes are
available to prosecute women experiencing them. 157 If that is the case, then the
revised language addresses none of the issues raised in the Mississippi debates. It is
unexceptional that personhood proponents would not condone drug use by pregnant
women, but what other activities should be considered problematic? If a physician
tells a woman to refrain from certain activities while pregnant, but she engages in
them anyway and experiences a miscarriage (regardless of intent), would those
women be subject to investigation or prosecution under the existing statutory
framework? If proponents are committed to the protection of the unborn, it is unclear
why they would consider such investigations to be “witch hunts.” The revised
personhood language does not appear to provide any protection in this regard, and
raising the possibility of investigation into miscarriages may not be fear mongering
or the use of scare tactics after all.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACEPTION AND/OR IN VITRO FERTILIZATION?
In the weeks leading up to the vote in Mississippi, a great deal of attention (and
confusion) 158 surrounded what impact, if any, Measure 26 would have on
contraception and/or IVF. 159 Personhood opponents suggested that the amendment
would outlaw contraception and IVF, while proponents fired back that anyone
raising these concerns was simply engaging in fear mongering or the use of scare
tactics. 160 Neither claim was entirely accurate. With no certainty regarding the
immediate impact of Measure 26 were it to have passed, assertions that the
amendment would definitely outlaw contraception or IVF were not correct.
Similarly, given the inconsistent statements made within the Personhood Movement

mothers.html?pagewanted=all (noting the relationship between chemical endangerment laws (like
seen in Alabama that are used to prosecute pregnant drug users) and the Personhood Movement). The
trend of criminally prosecuting pregnant women in similar circumstances is growing. See Pilkington,
supra note 153. For a general discussion of the rise of criminal and civil statut es regarding harm
caused to the preborn, see Brown, supra note 5, at 90-97.
155
Pilkington, supra note 153.
156
Id.
157
In a recent interview Keith Mason maintained that claims made about miscarriages by
opponents are ridiculous, but went on to note that “I know of cases where a woman that is addicted to
crack will have her baby and the state will take the crack baby away because of child abuse and
mandate the woman receive treatment—I’m good with that.” Pesta, supra note 41.
158
See Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117 n.13.
159
For a discussion of the potential implications for contraception and IVF, s ee, e.g., Grady,
supra note 131; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81.
160
See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117; Mandi D. Campbell, Reviving a Culture of Life
in America, 6 LIBERTY U. L. R EV. 283, 296 (2012) (stating that “in past personhood debates, proabortion groups and individuals told people that the personhood amendments would make birth
control and in-vitro fertilization illegal and engaged in other fear-mongering tactics that scared people
away from choosing life”); Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 64.
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regarding contraception and IVF, 161 it was disingenuous for proponents of the
amendment to claim that raising these concerns was simply resorting to scare tactics.
With respect to those proponents claiming that Measure 26 would need enabling
legislation, it was technically truthful, though perhaps misleading, for them to say
that the amendment itself would not outlaw contraception or IVF. 162 Misleading,
because if the amendment passed, it would leave open the possibility that the
subsequent enabling legislation would do just that. In fact, different proponents
appeared to have different views about the potential and intended impact of the
amendment on things like contraception and IVF. 163
It was clear that abortifacients like RU-486 that cause the embryo or fetus to
detach from the uterine wall and then be expelled from the body 164 would be
problematic, as would emergency contraception (such as Plan B, the “morning after
pill”)165 or intrauterine devices (IUDs) that are thought to prevent implantation of a
fertilized egg, but views considering standard hormonal contraceptives became more
opaque. 166 Likewise, while proponents consistently maintained that unused preembryos from an IVF cycle could not be discarded or destroyed, they were less
transparent about their intent regarding specific aspects of the IVF process that
create risk of harm to pre-embryos, like cryopreservation and the transfer process
itself.167 Some personhood proponents will openly express discomfort with current
IVF practices, 168 but a Mississippi attorney and “Yes on 26” spokesman was
adamant in his view that Measure 26 would not outlaw (or presumably significantly
restrict) IVF. 169 He publicly discussed his own two children conceived with the
assistance of IVF, and stated that IVF would not be banned by the measure. 170
The revised personhood language attempts to put these issues to rest with two
seemingly straightforward provisions. While “the intentional killing of any innocent
person is prohibited,” (1) “only birth control that kills a person” and (2) “only in
vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person” are affected by the
section. 171 The remainder of this paper now turns to whether the concerns raised
regarding contraception and IVF were legitimate (or just fear mongering), and
whether the revised language used within the Personhood Movement addresses
them.

161
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E.g., Jennifer E. Spreng, Pharmacists and the “Duty” to Dispense Emergency Contraceptives,
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SAME CONCERNS REGARDING REPRODUCTIVE

Recall that Measure 26 defined “person” with reference to fertilization, cloning,
or the functional equivalent thereof. 172 Under the revised language the term is
defined to apply “to every human being regardless of the method of creation,” where
“human being” means “a member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of
development.”173 This change was likely a response to those who pointed out that the
use of “fertilization” in Measure 26 was ambiguous, because it could refer to several
different moments in the early reproductive process ranging from when the sperm
penetrates the egg to successful implantation, which occurs as much as two weeks
later.174
Personhood USA is clear that it intends the rights and privileges associated with
personhood to attach as early as possible in the reproductive process. On its website,
instead of a reference to successful implantation, you find “[the zygote] formed by
the union of an oocyte [egg] and a sperm [as] the beginning of the new human
being.” 175 That said, “union of egg and sperm” is not the language used in the
revised amendments; nor should it be for at least two reasons. First, we now know
that the union of the genetic material in the egg and sperm itself is a process taking
some 48-72 hours to complete.176 Within this time period, the sperm penetrates the
egg, the maternal and paternal genetic material aligns, and then the new genome
activates.177 Using the phrase “any stage of development” is presumably an attempt
to select the earliest possible moment without the need to distinguish among these
developmental landmarks. Indeed, some have argued that human development
begins “when the egg and sperm have met.” 178 Second, the revised language
continues to allow cloned human beings to be included in the definition of
“person,”179 since the creation of a clone does not involve the union of an egg and
sperm. 180
It is worth noting, though I will not belabor here, that the lack of reference to
biological landmarks should not prove satisfying for those who believe that these
172
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being”). While this definition does not reference our more nuanced understanding of reproductive
physiology, by attaching personhood prior to the first cellular cleavage, it would plac e the persondefining moment within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Peters, supra
note 174, at 210 n.36.
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See supra Part II.
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distinctions are meaningful. Even if the rights and privileges associated with legal
personhood are meant to attach at the very beginning of biological life as opposed
to using some “thicker” conception of life 181 we ought to be clear about when this
“thin” notion of biological life actually begins. Importantly, personhood proponents
are attempting to avoid the slippery slope involved in discussions about “potential
life,” and when there is sufficient “potential” to be worthy of constitutional
protection.182 But it is not clear from the revised language when development of a
living member of the Homo sapiens species begins, 183 and it would not seem
appropriate to accord full constitutional protection to non-living members.
For example, until genomic activation occurs, the pre-embryonic genome is
dormant, as it lacks its own mitochondrial DNA (the cellular engine) to drive
development. 184 One could argue that until the genome has its own power source
(via genomic activation the timing of which is still not well understood), we do not
have a living member of the Homo sapiens species. 185 Genomic activation could
occur as late as the 100-cell stage (which would be several days after either the
sperm penetrates the egg or re-nucleation). 186 Therefore, making this distinction
would have drastic impacts on the permissibility of certain activities within the IVF
process, since no life would be lost unless occurring after genomic activation.187 In
addition, for those who find meaning in the concept of individual genetic identity
(numeric or otherwise) as it relates to defining members of the Homo sapiens
species, further discussion could be had regarding genomic alignment, cell
differentiation, and/or the process of twinning. 188
But for purposes here it will be assumed that the revised language intends for
the rights and privileges of personhood to attach very shortly after the sperm
penetrates the egg (or the egg is re-nucleated in the context of cloning); that is,
within the first twenty-four hours, and prior to the first cellular cleavage. 189 This is
significant because the earlier in the reproductive process that rights attach, the
greater the implications for reproductive choice.
A. PERSONHOOD AND CONTRACEPTION
The concern raised in regard to prior iterations of personhood measures was that
birth control methods that are effective in preventing successful pregnancy after the
sperm has penetrated the egg could be problematic, since “such birth control
181
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methods permit (or at least potentially permit) a person to come into existence, and
then effectively and intentionally ensure that person’s ultimate demise.” 190 It was
clear in Mississippi that barrier forms of contraception like condoms and
spermicides that prevent the sperm from reaching or penetrating the egg would not
be implicated. 191 On the other hand, personhood proponents openly condemned
IUDs, emergency contraception, and RU-486, since each of these are thought to be
effective after the sperm has penetrated the egg, either by preventing successful
implantation of the fertilized ovum, or by causing the pregnancy to terminate after
implantation has occurred. 192 Up for debate was the intended (or potential) impact of
personhood on hormonal contraceptives that are used by many women in the United
States.193
The revised language does nothing to clarify the stance of personhood
proponents when it comes to hormonal contraception. 194 Eliminating the word
fertilization from the definition of “person” does not address the issue nor does
inclusion of the statement that only birth control that “kills a person” is prohibited.
When pressed, Keith Mason recently explained that he is “not opposed to
contraception,” just “methods that “kill a living human being.” 195 But that is
precisely the concern associated with hormonal contraceptives, which are effective
by using the same mechanisms of operation utilized in what personhood proponents
find clearly problematic emergency contraceptives like Plan B. 196
Just briefly, hormonal contraceptives (including emergency contraception) 197
have been thought to utilize multiple mechanisms of operation to prevent pregnancy:
190
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constitutional amendment in North Dakota similarly would have outlawed “birth control that can be
clinically proven to kill a person,” and the state department of health was tas ked with providing a list
of any such forms of contraception. See S.B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb., § 2(2)(a) (N.D. 2013),
available
at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-823102000.pdf?20130213153739. But given the current status of our clinical understanding of the postfertilization effects of certain forms of birth control, it is unclear what that list might have looked like.
See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
196
See, e.g., Rachel White-Domain, Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience
Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation and the War on Reproductive Freedom, 59 DE PAUL L.
R EV. 1249, 1260 (2010).
197
There are different types of hormonal contraception and emergency contraception. The most
common types of hormonal contraception are combined pills (“COCs,” which contain both estrogen
and progesterone), and progesterone-only pills (POPs). See, e.g., Walter L. Larimore, M.D., Growing
Debate About the Abortifacient Effect of the Birth Control Pill and the Principle of D ouble Effect, 16
E THICS & M ED. 23 (2000), available at http://www.epm.org/resources/2004/Oct/01/growing-debateabout-abortifacient-effect-birth-co/. Emergency contraception may involve the Yuzpe method (taking
larger doses of daily oral contraceptive pills), or Plan B (a regimen of two doses of levonorgestrel
taken twelve hours apart). Spreng, supra note 164, at 224-26. In addition, the FDA recently approved
“Plan B One-Step,” which involves a single dose of lovenorgestrel, and ulipristal acetate -based EC
191
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(1) preventing ovulation as an initial matter by suppressing pituitary gonadotropin
secretion, which is the mechanism operative most of the time; (2) altering cervical
mucus to limit sperm penetration; (3) altering the endometrium (uterine lining) and
fallopian tube to impede sperm travel; and (4) altering the endometrium rendering it
inhospitable to successful implantation. 198 A woman who avoids pregnancy by
taking hormonal contraception will not know which of these mechanisms worked. 199
The pill (morning-after or standard) may have failed to prevent ovulation and failed
to prevent the sperm from penetrating the egg, but nonetheless succeeded in
preventing the fertilized ovum from implanting, which would lead to the death of
this newly recognized person.200
Importantly, the true post-fertilization impact of hormonal contraceptives,
including emergency contraceptives, is still hotly debated. 201 To the extent these
methods are found to be only effective prior to the sperm penetrating the egg,
personhood ought to have no impact on the permissibility of such contraceptives.
But assuming that these methods can be effective in preventing successful pregnancy
post-fertilization (by preventing intrauterine implantation and/or causing a
miscarriage), perhaps the most forthright response regarding personhood’s intended
impact comes from Bill Fortenberry, a prominent personhood advocate in
Alabama.202
In his article Personhood and the Pill, Fortenberry wrote that to the extent
hormonal contraception has an abortifacient effect, it would be banned by a
personhood amendment. 203 He discussed research addressing whether hormonal
contraception has such an effect, including one study that showed that twenty-one
out of twenty-five women who became pregnant while on an oral hormonal
contraceptive subsequently miscarried, which is twice the miscarriage rate for
women not on the pill.204
(ella), which is effective up to 120 hours after intercourse. M ARK R. WICCLAIR , C ONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION IN HEALTH C ARE 22 (2011).
198
Walter L. Larimore, M.D. & Joseph B. Stanford, M.D., Postfertilization Effects of Oral
Contraceptives and Their Relationship to Informed Consent, 9 ARCH. FAM. M ED. 126, 127-29 (2000).
199
Id.
200
Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 69. Dr. Larimore notes that POPs and Norplant (a
subcutaneously implanted progesterone rod) are more likely to be effective post -fertilization than
COCs. Larimore, supra note 197. Indeed, some opponents to the “hostile endometrium theory” argue
that the level of progesterone in COCs is too low to have the post-fertilization impact suggested,
particularly given the changed hormonal environment that would exist if break -through ovulation
should occur. Id.
201
See Spreng, supra note 164, at 223; Michelle Castillo, Investigation Reveals Morning-After
Pill May Not Prevent Implantation, CBS NEWS (June 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301504763_162-57448998-10391704/investigation-reveals-morning-after-pill-may-not-preventimplantation/. Drs. Larimore and Stanford, on the other hand, cite to studies showing that hormonal
contraception can alter the endometrium in a fashion that decreases the likelihood of successful intra uterine implantation. Larimore & Stanford, supra note 198, at 128-29 (noting that hormonal
contraceptives reduce the thickness of the endometrium, alter integrin expression, and also potentially
increase the risk of extra-uterine implantation, such as ectopic pregnancies). Several studies have
indicated that the risk of ectopic pregnancy is higher for women using POPs. Id. at 129. Dr. Larimore
acknowledges, however, that there are opponents to the “hostile endometrium theory,” and he admits
that little direct evidence exists for the true post-fertilization impacts of hormonal contraception.
Larimore, supra note 197.
202
See Bill Fortenberry, Personhood and the Pill, PERSONHOOD INITIATIVE , available at
http://www.personhoodinitiative.com/personhood-and-the-pill.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
203
Id.
204
Id. Note that this is different from the question of which mechanism of operation makes the
birth control method effective in preventing pregnancy. Here we are talking about the failure of the
birth control to prevent pregnancy (successful implantation), yet nonetheless causing a subsequent
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Given the increased likelihood demonstrated in the study for hormonal
contraception to lead to miscarriage (and the death of a person), Fortenberry
explicitly concluded that the “Personhood Initiative will continue to advocate for a
ban of any form of birth control that can be proven to cause the deaths of innocent
children.” 205 While Mason can appear evasive when asked about contraception,
Fortenberry’s position is clearly consistent with the goal of the Personhood
Movement to protect all innocent persons, where personhood is considered to attach
within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Following the
loss in Mississippi, one personhood advocate who expressly believes that the
personhood movement would outlaw any type birth control that permits the
fertilization of the egg noted that, in voting down the amendment, some
conservatives demonstrated that they “are not really so pro-life as [they] think.”206
The relationship between pre-embryonic personhood and contraception can also
be seen in the debates surrounding conscience clause legislation in the healthcare
context. 207 These laws permit service providers and institutions to deny providing
medical services on the basis of conscientious objection, and suggest that certain
forms of birth control could be at risk of significant regulation under a personhood
framework, even if the legislation or amendments that pass do not specifically
impose them. 208
At the federal level, in 2008 the Bush Administration pushed the Provider
Conscience Regulation (PCR) in order to protect providers who refuse to perform
certain actions based on conscience. 209 The PCR attempted to define abortion 210 “to
include any action that prevents the implantation of a fertilized egg, effectively
including the birth control pill, other hormonal contraceptives and the intrauterine
device.”211 The Obama Administration rescinded most of the PCR in 2011, 212 but
miscarriage. It is the increased risk of miscarriage that Fortenberry is identifying as being
problematic. In other words, when the pill is successful (operating pre-fertilization), it may not be
problematic under a personhood framework; however, it would still be problematic given the risk that
the pill will fail to prevent pregnancy, yet nonetheless lead to miscarriage. Id.
205
Id.
206
Mohler, supra note 182. One survey suggested that the majority of American Catholics
disagree with the Church’s prohibitions on contraception. Elizabeth Sepper, Not Only the Doctor’s
Dilemma: The Complexity of Conscience in Medicine, 4 FAULKNER L. R EV. 385, 399-400 (2013)
(citing C ATHOLICS FOR C HOICE , IN GOOD C ONSCIENCE : RESPECTING THE B ELIEFS OF HEALTHCARE
PROVIDERS AND THE NEEDS OF PATIENTS 10 (2010)).
207
For a comprehensive discussion of laws regarding freedom of conscience, see Nadia N.
Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 C ARDOZO L. R EV. 1389 (2012); for a
discussion of the relationship between the Personhood Movement and conscience legislation, see
Jonathan F. Will, Conscience Legislation, the Personhood Movement, and Access to Emergency
Contraception, 4 FAULKNER L. R EV. 411 (2013) [hereinafter Will, Conscience Legislation].
208
See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 207; Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207.
209
White-Domain, supra note 196, at 1250 n.13 (identifying the full name of the regulation as
“Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law,” which was located at 45 C.F.R.
§ 88 (2008) (rescinded by Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider
Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968-02 (Feb. 23, 2011)).
210
The earliest conscience laws, like the Church Amendment, concerned abortion, and were
enacted shortly after Roe v. Wade. See Pope, supra note 192, at 164.
211
Adam Sonfield, Proposed ‘Conscience’ Regulation Opposed Widely as Threat to Reproductive
Health
and
Beyond,
11
GUTTMACHER
POL’Y
R EV.
4
(2008),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/4/gpr110417.html.
212
Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws,
76 Fed. Reg. at 9968-02; see also Rob Stein, Obama Administration Replaces Controversial
“Conscience” Regulation for Health Care Workers, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807443.html.
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recently proposed federal legislation would have offered even broader protection for
conscientious objection,213 and individual states have also taken up this cause. 214
Although conscientious objection to abortion has long been protected by most
states, by the mid-2000s, states increasingly began to acknowledge objections to the
provision of emergency contraception. 215 Some states have expanded their
conscientious objection protection in a way that would include any form of
contraception.216 The Guttmacher Institute reports that as of August 2012 there are
fourteen states that allow some healthcare providers to refuse to provide
contraception, and six states explicitly permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense
contraceptives. 217 Mississippi was actually the first state to broadly permit
pharmacists to deny the provision of contraceptives, 218 and more recently, Missouri
attempted to pass a bill that would have permitted employers and insurance
providers to deny coverage for contraceptives. 219
There are clearly those who find certain forms of contraception problematic, and
conscience legislation serves to protect that individual (or institutional) belief. But
properly understood, the adoption of a personhood framework could be viewed to
represent a state-wide (at least majoritarian) acceptance of the principles upon which
these birth control methods are condemned. 220 Given the stated goal of the
Personhood Movement to recognize and protect pre-embryonic human life, 221 even if
the measure itself did not immediately outlaw certain forms of birth control, if
proponents seek to remain consistent with the position, it is entirely possible that
they would push for their given state to regulate contraception more heavily in an
effort to offer protection to these newly recognized persons.
There are personhood advocates who support an outright ban on certain forms of
contraception as a means to protect pre-embryonic persons from those
contraceptives that could potentially cause their death. 222 But even if we take the
213
Sepper, supra note 206, at 386 (discussing the Respect for Rights of Conscience Act, S. 1467,
112th Cong., (2011-2012), a law “that would have permitted any person or entity to refuse to provide
any care even if the refusal results in a person’s death”).
214
Pope, supra note 192, at 165.
215
Id. at 164.
216
Id. at 166.
217
See Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207, at 416 (citing STATE POLICIES IN B RIEF:
R EFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES, GUTTMACHER INST . (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf (identifying the six states as Arizona,
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, and South Dakota)).
218
Brittany L. Grimes, The Plan B for Plan B: The New Dual Over-the-Counter and Prescription
Status of Plan B and Its Impact Upon Pharmacists, Consumers, and Conscience Clauses, 41 GA. L.
R EV. 1395, 1402 (2007) (citing Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives:
Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 49 (2006)). In fact,
the Mississippi statute permits conscientious objection by any person “who furnishes, or assists in the
furnishing of” healthcare services, which is a term broadly defined to include “patient referral,
counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or
administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment .” See M ISS.
C ODE ANN. § 41-107-3, § 41-107-5 (West 2009).
219
See Kevin Murphy, Missouri Law to Deny Birth Control Coverage Vetoed, REUTERS (Jul. 12,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-contraception-missouriidUSBRE86B1B620120712.
220
Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207, at 412 (highlighting Professor Sepper’s
suggestion that “a possible purpose behind conscience legislation is to ‘make abortions, family
planning, and end-of-life care more difficult to obtain,’ and that the true goal of such legislation is
‘hostility to reproductive health and patients’ interests.’” Sepper, supra note 206, at 406).
221
See About Personhood, supra note 31.
222
In a subsequent paper, I will discuss the constitutionality of any proposed restriction on
hormonal contraceptives, but briefly, while Supreme Court precedent establishes that a state could not
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position that these forms of contraception carry the risk of causing death to a person,
it does not necessarily follow that these forms of birth control must be banned. After
all, the Constitution is currently interpreted to permit capital punishment, so it
cannot be said that human life must always be protected. 223 Perhaps to account for
this, the revised personhood language only purports to protect “innocent” persons.224
Even still, there are many activities that are perfectly permissible notwithstanding
the fact that they involve a significant risk of loss of innocent human life. 225
For instance, in 2012 the United States Census Bureau reported statistics
showing that nearly 34,000 people died in 2009 from motor vehicle accidents. 226
While adults can surely make an autonomous decision to assume this risk, the many
children under the age of fifteen who died in accidents 227 did not make that choice.
Because we permit adults to subject children to this known risk of loss of innocent
human life, risk of loss of life alone does not seem sufficient to support an outright
ban on an activity. By analogy, a parent driving her child hopes to arrive at her
destination without having a car accident, though she is certainly aware of the risk
that an accident will occur and that her child might die. Similarly, a woman using
hormonal contraception may hope to avoid pregnancy without fertilization taking
place, though she remains aware of the risk that pregnancy is avoided only after a
person comes into existence and then dies when implantation fails or is disrupted. In
either case, at the time the decision is made (to drive or use hormonal contraception),
the woman does not know whether a death will result, and indeed, it would be very
difficult to predict the likelihood that a death would result.
As a society, a decision has been made that it is acceptable for a certain number
of lives to be lost (innocent or otherwise) in exchange for the convenience of motor
vehicle transportation. Of course, the states regulate such transportation to make it as
safe as possible. Few would question the convenience that comes with the ability to
use contraception the question would be, at what cost? Rather than immediately
imposing an outright ban on forms of contraception that create a risk of loss of pre embryonic life, we ought to ask what level of risk is acceptable, and what level of
regulation is necessary to achieve it. The Guttmacher Institute recently reported that
when used properly, the pill prevents pregnancy over ninety-nine percent of the
time; however, it is not clear what proportion of that ninety-nine percent involved
the death of a pre-embryonic person. 228 This information would be relevant to
properly make the assessment suggested here. 229 Regardless of the result of such an
outlaw all forms of contraception, it is far less clear whether certain forms of contraception could be
restricted given a state’s (compelling?) interest in protecting pre-embryonic persons following
adoption of a personhood framework. Cohen, supra note 15, at 1167-72; Mark Strasser, The Next
Battleground? Personhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies , 65 OKLA. L. R EV. 177,
198-99 (2013); Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 74.
223
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 741 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
224
See infra Appendix I.
225
See, e.g., Dylan P. Kletter, Negligence in the (Thin) Air: Understanding the Legal
Relationship Between Outfitters and Participants in High Risk Expeditions Through Analysis of the
1996 Mount Everest Tragedy, 40 CONN . L. R EV. 769, 784 (2008) (noting that a mountain climber may
choose to participate in a particular climb because of the likelihood of death).
226
U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU , FATAL M OTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS—NATIONAL SUMMARY : 19902009,
at
694
tbl.1105
(2012),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1105.pdf.
227
The census data included a finding that 6.88 minors under the age of 15 died in vehicular
accidents per 100,000 residents. Id.
228
See GUTTMACHER, supra note 193.
229
One could also argue that the high rate of natural miscarriage (leading to the death of pre embryonic persons) should lead to restrictions on unprotected sex itself. But personhood proponents
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inquiry, it cannot be said to be fear mongering to discuss the potential impacts of
pre-embryonic personhood on contraception, and the types of restrictions 230 that
might follow if such a framework is adopted.
B. PERSONHOOD AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Like contraception, debates surrounding Measure 26 in Mississippi revealed
questions about whether passage of the amendment would outlaw IVF. As noted, the
revised personhood language states that “only in vitro fertilization and assisted
reproduction that kills a person” are affected.231 But if proponents are serious about
extending the rights of legal personhood to pre-embryos, then protecting these
persons from serious injury should also be a priority. Given the inherent risks to preembryos associated with IVF, there should be real concern that significant
restrictions would result from the passage of a personhood measure either from the
amendment itself or from subsequent legislation. 232 Keith Mason has suggested that
while personhood may not necessarily “ban” IVF, he would like to see it
“reformed.”233 The question is how.
If a personhood framework is established utilizing the revised language, it is not
clear what aspects of IVF would be immediately problematic, or might be subject to
future restriction. In one of the few cases to consider the status of pre-embryos
created in the IVF process, the court in Davis v. Davis suggested that if pre-embryos
were afforded “the legal status of ‘persons’ . . . vested . . . with legally cognizable
interests separate from those of their progenitors, [s]uch a decision would doubtless
have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the [S]tate of Tennessee.”234 Of
particular importance here, the Davis Court explored Tennessee’s public policies
regarding the treatment of pre-embryos (as gleaned from the legal treatment of
fetuses), and determined that pre-embryos “[could] not be considered ‘persons’
under Tennessee law.”235 Affording this consideration to pre-embryos is, of course,
the very purpose of the Personhood Movement.
For the same reasons mentioned in the context of contraception, I am not
convinced that adoption of a personhood framework would require IVF to be
expressly outlawed. Nevertheless, several of the procedures that are available within
the process, such as pre-embryo selection, cryopreservation, pre-implantation
genetic screening (PGS), and even the transfer process itself, pose significant risk of
injury or destruction to the pre-embryos involved. 236 The following section will
do not appear to be arguing for such restrictions, and the idea of the government regulating sexual
activity itself (as opposed to the types of contraception or ART available) raises a host of
constitutional problems that are beyond the scope of this project. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute that criminalized certain sexual behavior between members
of the same sex to violate the Due Process Clause); see infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text for
discussion of this issue in the context of IVF.
230
In Germany and Italy, for instance, regulations limit the number of pre-embryos that may be
created and transferred for implantation to reduce the risk of loss in the IVF process. See infra notes
273-274 and accompanying text.
231
See infra Appendix I.
232
Even if the amendment itself does not implicate injury caused to pre-embryos, it is possible
that other statutory provisions would be available to address such harms. See supra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text (discussing unintentional drug-induced miscarriages).
233
Kounang, supra note 17; Pesta, supra note 41.
234
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
235
Id. at 594-95.
236
See Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a
Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
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discuss the risks associated with these procedures, and the types of restrictions on
the practice of IVF that might be expected under a personhood framework. 237 Even
without an outright ban on IVF, such restrictions could be stringent enough to make
it effectively impossible for these reproductive services to be provided.
1. Pre-Embryo Creation, Selection, and Cryopreservation
In order for pre-embryos to be created, the male and female gametes (sperm and
ova) must be retrieved.238 The process for obtaining ova (or oocytes) is significantly
more “onerous, painful, and risky than acquiring sperm,” 239 and it is also very
expensive. 240 The woman from whom ova will be retrieved must undergo daily
injections of hormones to stimulate her ovaries to produce mature oocytes, which are
then extracted laparoscopically using a needle guided by ultrasound. 241 Clinicians
attempt to retrieve as many ova as possible, not just because of the cost and burden
of the retrieval process, but also to increase the chances of successful fertilization
and development. 242 In addition, clinicians will typically attempt to fertilize each of
the ova retrieved, due to the low success rate historically associated with the
cryopreservation of unfertilized ova. 243
During the first forty hours following introduction of the sperm to the ovum, an
inspection is performed to determine whether cellular division has commenced. 244
Clinicians visually inspect the form and structure (morphology) of the pre-embryos
in order to select those of the highest quality 245 for immediate use in implantation. 246
The “least robust” pre-embryos identified through this visual inspection are typically
discarded, and sufficiently robust, though perhaps not the best pre-embryos that
exceed the number to be immediately implanted are commonly cryopreserved. 247
143, 146 (2009); Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & E THICS 283, 292-93 n.37 (2008).
237
In a subsequent paper, I will explore the constitutionality of any such restrictions. See supra
note 23.
238
Fuselier, supra note 236, at 146.
239
Id.
240
Many fertility clinics do not itemize the various costs associated with an IVF cycle on their
websites, but at least two clinics advertised egg retrieval costs that alone exceed $2,000. Sample IVF
Costs, R EPROD. HEALTH C TR. (2012), http://www.ivftucson.com/financial-information/sample-ivfcosts; Fertility, QUILLEN ETSU PHYSICIANS (2012), http://www.etsuphysicians.com/medicalservices/fertility.html (select “What are my costs?” from the left-hand panel).
241
Fuselier, supra note 236, at 146-47.
242
Id. at 146 n.20.
243
Id. at 147. As will be discussed, research involving the cryopreservation of ova (as opposed to
pre-embryos) is ongoing, and may offer an alternative that would seem more permissible under a
personhood framework.
244
Id. at 144.
245
See, e.g., Meredith A. Reynolds et al., Risk of Multiple Birth Associated with In Vitro
Fertilization Using Donor Eggs, 154 AM. J. E PIDEMIOLOGY 1043, 1044 (2001). This visual inspection
is to be distinguished from the genetic testing associated with PGS.
246
Maureen Wood, Embryo Freezing: Is it Safe?, IVF. NET (Aug. 2, 2004),
http://www.ivf.net/ivf/embryo-freezing-is-it-safe-o335.html (noting that the “best” pre-embryos are
selected for fresh IVF cycles, as opposed to cryopreserving the best pre -embryos). Even where
successful pregnancy and birth is achieved through IVF, because of a lack of studies (and the fact that
symptoms may not appear for years), it is not well understood whether potential genetic abnormalities
or defects may be caused by the IVF process. See Gina Kolata, Picture Emerging on Genetic Risks of
IVF,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
16,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/health/17ivf.html?_r=1&nl=8hlth&emc=hlthal .
Further
understanding of these issues could lead to restrictions on the practice of IVF without regard to
personhood.
247
Peters, supra note 174, at 217.
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Under a personhood framework the visual inspection and discarding of pre-embryos
could be problematic, as could cryopreservation.
If personhood attaches within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm
penetrates the egg, then a person would exist at the time the visual inspection is
made. Proponents may seek to impose restrictions on the techniques and protocol
used by clinicians to determine whether a given pre-embryonic person is fit for
implantation. For instance, it is possible that cellular division fails to initiate or that
otherwise very little development occurs after the sperm penetrates the egg. 248 In this
situation personhood proponents might agree that the pre-embryonic person is not
alive (or no longer alive?), 249 though they may still call for compassionate
treatment 250 of this deceased person.
On the other hand, cellular division may begin, but the morphology of the pre embryo may suggest that development is abnormal and unlikely to result in
successful implantation or pregnancy. Given the stated goal of protecting all life,
without exception, 251 proponents would likely be uncomfortable with clinicians
discarding living, though abnormal, pre-embryonic persons based on visual
inspection. Under a personhood framework, it could be mandated that these preembryos either be transferred into the woman (and thus, at least given a chance at
continued development, 252 as opposed to the certain death that discarding would
bring), or that they be cryopreserved. 253 While cryopreservation offers many
benefits, it also presents its own problems. 254
Cryopreservation is a routine part of the IVF process, 255 and it typically takes
place when the pre-embryo is in the four- to eight-cell stage. 256 The existence of
cryopreservation as an available option reduces the number of egg extractions a
woman must undergo, and allows clinicians to transfer a smaller number of pre248

See Fuselier, supra note 236, at 144.
The awkwardness of using the language of “life” and “person” in this context highlights the
deficiencies associated with ignoring the biological realities of the early reproductive process
previously discussed. Under Louisiana law pre-embryos are recognized as juridical persons; however,
if the fertilized ovum fails to develop (other than due to cryopreservation), it is considered nonviable,
and not a juridical person. LA R EV. STAT . ANN . § 9:129 (2008). Similarly, a statute was recently
proposed in Georgia that would have identified pre-embryos as human beings, but also included the
statement that a pre-embryo that “fails to show any sign of life over a 36 hour period outside a state of
cryopreservation shall be considered no longer living.” S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2009), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf (emphasis added).
250
Even a national infertility organization that opposes personhood initiatives advises those
undergoing IVF to inquire as to the options available for any pre-embryos (unfit or otherwise) not
transferred to the woman’s uterus. One option listed is a “disposal ceremony,” designed to create “a
special moment to come to closure regarding the [pre-]embryos.” After IVF: The Embryo Decision,
R ESOLVE : NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N (2013), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/donoroptions/after-ivf-the-embryo-decision.html.
251
About Personhood, supra note 31.
252
We might question whether attempted implantation would be appropriate in these
circumstances. Under a personhood framework, this abnormal pre-embryo would possess the same
legal and moral status as you or I do. If clinicians determine that this pre-embryo has a very low
probability of surviving the implantation process, then what justi fication would there be for sending
this person we are trying to protect off to near certain death? Would it not be better to cryopreserve
the pre-embryo in the hopes that one day technology would improve the odds of successful
implantation and pregnancy? See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the risks associated with the transfer process.
253
See, e.g., Personhood Doesn’t Ban IVF, a Response to Atlee Breland, PERSONHOOD USA
(2013), http://www.personhoodusa.com/blog/personhood-doesnt-ban-ivf-response-atlee-breland/.
254
See, e.g., Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147.
255
Wood, supra note 246.
256
Peters, supra note 174, at 217.
249
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embryos into a woman in a given cycle (thereby reducing the risk of multiple births),
because excess pre-embryos can be saved for later use. 257 But the cryopreservation
process also presents risk of injury or destruction to the pre-embryonic persons
involved, which stems from the freezing and thawing processes, as well as the state
and duration of being frozen. 258
In order to survive the freezing process, pre-embryos must “withstand
potentially lethal ice formation, transmembrane water movement and extreme
changes in external electrolyte concentrations, temperature and pH.” 259 Then they
must survive the reversal of these conditions associated with the thawing process. 260
While it is theoretically possible to keep pre-embryos frozen indefinitely, it is
unclear whether, after a certain period of time, the pre-embryos become unsuitable
for implantation. 261 In 2010 there was a successful birth resulting from the use of a
pre-embryo that had been frozen for nearly twenty years; though it is worth noting
that there were originally five such pre-embryos: only two survived the thawing
process and were implanted, and only one resulted in a live birth. 262 In other words,
eighty percent of the pre-embryonic persons involved died in the process, which may
not be considered a success story.
The survival rates for cryopreserved pre-embryos vary from clinic to clinic with
anywhere from 20-40% not surviving the freezing and thawing process. 263 In
addition, at least some studies have shown that successful pregnancies are less likely
to occur when using thawed as opposed to fresh pre-embryos,264 and unsuccessful
implantation obviously leads to the death of the pre-embryonic person involved.
Further, the risks associated with cryopreservation are not limited to survival of the
pre-embryo or suitability for implantation. 265 We are only just beginning to study the
question of whether freezing can cause genetic modification and/or defects, some of
which may not be expressed until years after birth. 266
This data would clearly be relevant in assessing whether cryopreservation poses
an unacceptable risk of death or injury to pre-embryonic persons. In the meantime,
knowledge of these risks could very realistically lead to restrictions on the use of
cryopreservation under a personhood framework. After all, once we’ve identified a
pre-embryonic person, decisions made (or regulations imposed) regarding that
257

Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147.
Id.
259
Wood, supra note 246.
260
Id.
261
Whether cryopreserved persons are “alive” as opposed to being in some sort of limbo, or
whether they are (or ought to be) entitled to the same legal rights and protections as “thawed” persons
are also interesting questions.
262
Cynthia S. Marietta, Birth of Healthy Baby from 20-Year-Old Frozen Embryo Raises Ethical
Questions,
UNIV .
HOUS.
LAW
C TR.
1,
1-2
(Jan.
2011),
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2011/(CM)%20IVF.pdf.
263
Wood, supra note 246. See Marietta, supra note 262.
264
Wood, supra note 246. The data reported by the CDC indicate that, as a percentage of
transfers resulting in live birth, fresh transfers are more successful for women under the age forty, but
less successful than thawed transfers for women forty-one and older. See Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART) Report, C TRS FOR DISEASE C ONTROL & PREVENTION (2010),
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/art/Apps/NationalSummaryReport.aspx .
265
See Marietta, supra note 262, at 3-4 (explaining that the combination of freezing/thawing
techniques could potentially pose medical risks to resulting children).
266
See, e.g., id. (describing recent work performed by the Jones Institute, a preeminent IVF
research institute in Norfolk, Virginia, and generally noting the limited number of studies conducted
regarding IVF-conceived children); see also Gina Kolata, Picture Emerging on Genetic Risks of IVF,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
16,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/health/17ivf.html?_r=1&nl=8hlth&emc=hlthal.
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person including whether it is permissible to subject the person to
cryopreservation 267 can fairly be scrutinized using a best interests standard. 268
While this is certainly true with respect to activities potentially resulting in the death
of these persons who would have a constitutionally protected right to life, it can be
more complicated when discussing the permissibility of genetic interventions that
might be said to harm the pre-embryonic persons involved. The best interests
standard seems appropriate, assuming (rightly or wrongly), as I believe personhood
proponents would, that any genetic intervention that impacts pre-embryonic persons,
though does not bring about death, would be identity-preserving. 269 In other words,
that any genetic damage that might occur as a result of cryopreservation would not
change the identity of the pre-embryonic person involved, and thus we can say that
harm involved has occurred to a presently-existing (not future, as-yet unidentified)
person.270
As a result, it may be mandated that pre-embryos in a current state of
cryopreservation remain frozen until the thawing technique becomes safer. Further,
future cryopreservation of pre-embryonic persons could be outlawed entirely, with
fertility clinics permitted to fertilize only those ova that will be immediately
implanted. In Italy, cryopreservation of pre-embryos is expressly prohibited because
“it constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings . . . .”271 Clinicians
may fertilize no more than three ova in a given cycle, and each pre-embryo created
must be transferred, regardless of its health status. 272 While not expressly outlawing
cryopreservation, Germany’s Embryo Protection Act makes it a crime to attempt to
fertilize more ova than may be transferred in one cycle, and permits no more than
three pre-embryos to be transferred.273
267
This argument is equally applicable to any harm that might occur as a result of PGS, which is
discussed below.
268
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that after the trial judge
determined that the pre-embryos should be treated as “children in vitro,” the judge “then invoked the
doctrine of parens patriae and held that it was ‘in the best interest of the children’ to be born rather
than destroyed”); see also LA. R EV. STAT . ANN. § 9:131 (2012) (stating that “in disputes arising
between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such
disputes is to be in the best interests of the in vitro fertilized ovum”).
269
See infra note 299.
270
See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96
M INN . L. R EV. 423 (2012); I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 M INN . L. R EV. 1187 (2012) (In
a two-article series, Cohen arguing that the best interests standard, utilized to protect existing
children, does not seem satisfying as a justification for restricting reproductive choices that might
impact future children.). For instance, in arguing against potential restrictions on say the elderly
having access to IVF, Professor Cohen uses Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem to note that assuming the
resulting child would have a life worth living, such child cannot be said to be harmed by permitting
the elderly person to undergo IVF, since the alternative would be no life at all. See DEREK PARFIT ,
R EASONS AND PERSONS 358-61 (1984). Assuming that the genetic interventions I discuss in this paper
are identity-preserving, Professor Cohen’s argument against the use of the best interests standard
would not be implicated, since the pre-embryonic persons involved are already in existence and thus,
we are not speaking about harming future persons. See infra note 299 for additional discussion of this
issue.
271
Jeffrey T. Wise, Comment, Embryo Banking as a Novel Option for the Infertile? Law, Policy,
and a Proposed Model Act, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 163, 181 (2007) (citing Rachel Anne
Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction,
14 M ED. L. R EV. 73, 98 (2006)).
272
Id.
273
Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990,
B UNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.), translation available at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf .
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Recent personhood efforts in the State of Georgia at the legislative level are also
informative. 274 In 2009 the organization Georgia Right to Life helped to draft a bill
that would have offered legal protection 275 to pre-embryos as “biological human
being[s] who [are] not the property of any person or entity.”276 As introduced to the
Senate, the bill would have effectively outlawed the future use of cryopreservation
by prohibiting clinics from creating more pre-embryos in a single cycle than would
be transferred in that cycle. 277 The initial draft also limited the number of acceptable
transfers in a given cycle to two pre-embryos for women under forty, and three preembryos for women over forty. 278 Opponents successfully lobbied against these
provisions by arguing that they would impede infertility treatments. 279 Indeed, since
passage of Italy’s very restrictive regulations on IVF, the rate of Italians seeking
fertility treatments in other countries (fertility tourism) has tripled. 280 Nonetheless,
the original language proposed in Georgia 281 highlights the type of restrictions we
might expect if a personhood measure passes in the future.
One possible result of such restrictions would be the devotion of further
research to improving techniques for freezing and thawing ova which, while
currently considered experimental, 282 would not involve a risk to human life under a
personhood framework. Although freezing and thawing eggs has historically been

274

See, e.g., Georgia’s “Personhood Amendment” Passes with a Super Majority, GA. R IGHT TO
LIFE (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.grtl.org/?q=node/270; see also Jim Galloway, A House Democrat to
Sponsor Personhood Amendment, ATLANTA JOURNAL-C ONSTITUTION (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2011/11/15/a-house-democrat-to-sponsorpersonhood-amendment/.
275
Betsy McKay, In-Vitro Fertilization Limit is Sought, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123603828823714509.html.
276
S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-64(a) (Ga. 2009), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf.
277
Id. at § 19-7-66. A more recent bill that was proposed to accompany a personhood amendment
in North Dakota was struck down by the State Senate that would have similarly restricted the number
of embryos created to those that would be transferred in a given cycle. S .B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb.,
§7 (N.D. 2013), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-823102000.pdf?20130213153739
278
S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-67 (Ga. 2009), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf. At least with respect to the number of transfers
permitted, the legislation is not dramatically different than the recommendations and guidelines established
by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, or current practices within IVF clinics in the United
States. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text. This suggests an area where those in favor of IVF
may find common ground with personhood proponents.
279
See, e.g., The National Infertility Association and Supporters Defeat Dangerous Georgia Bill,
R ESOLVE : NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.resolve.org/about/resolve-thenational-infertility-association-and-supporters-defeat-dangerous-georgia-bill.html (recounting how
“the outrage from the family building community forced Georgia legislators to backpedal, re -write,
and delete many of the provisions of the bill that would have harmed infertility patients ”).
280
Wise, supra note 271, at 181.
281
The version of S.B. 169 that passed in the Senate does not contain the language regarding
cryopreservation or limited pre-embryo transfer. See S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7
(Ga. 2009), available at http://legiscan.com/GA/text/SB169/2009 (permitting pre-embryo
cryopreservation, though limiting the ways in which pre-embryos may be created, and providing that
pre-embryos may be created “solely for the purposes of initiating a human pregnancy”).
282
Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Insurance Coverage for Cancer Treatment-Induced Conditions:
Comparing Fertility Preservation Technology and Breast Reconstructive Surgery, 61 DEPAUL L. R EV.
849, 856 (2012) (noting that the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) still considers
egg cryopreservation to be experimental); see also U.B. Wennerhold et al., Children Born After
Cryopreservation of Embryos or Oocytes: A Systematic Review of Outcome Data, 24 HUMAN R EPROD.
2158, 2169 (2009), available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/9/2158.full.pdf+html
(stating that data on children born after egg cryopreservation is “sparse”).
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less successful than freezing and thawing pre-embryos, 283 recent reports suggest that
methods are improving. 284 Success in this endeavor would also address the issue of
women having to undergo multiple egg-extraction procedures where pre-embryo
cryopreservation is prohibited.
2. Preimplantation Genetic Screening

285

Regardless of whether fresh or thawed pre-embryos are to be transferred, the
participants in IVF increasingly choose to have PGS performed. 286 PGS requires the
removal of one of the cells from a four- to eight-cell pre-embryo and testing it for
certain genetic characteristics. 287 At the point when PGS is performed, each cell
within the pre-embryo contains a fully-assembled, though inactive genome, and each
cell is totipotent, with the capability of developing into a separate human being. 288
Because the extracted cell is destroyed in the testing process, if the cell itself is
considered a separate person that would obviously seem problematic. 289
That said, PGS can be used to identify genetic abnormalities that would not
have been caught through the visual inspection of the pre-embryos. 290 The most
severe abnormalities are fatal, but under current practice, if PGS reveals any
unwanted genetic characteristic (for instance, trisomy 21—Down syndrome) the preembryos would typically just be discarded or donated for research. 291 Clinics have
also permitted the use of PGS for purposes of selecting pre-embryos for implantation
that have certain desired traits such as a particular gender or those likely to develop
into children with deafness or dwarfism. 292 And again, if infertility treatment ends
before the supply of pre-embryos is exhausted, the unused pre-embryos (including
those without the desired gender or those likely to develop into hearing children or
children of normal height) are typically discarded or donated for research. 293
Discarding or donating pre-embryos for research would be problematic under a
personhood framework that strives to protect human life regardless of disability or
the existence of particular genetic traits.
283

Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147.
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of Gametes from
Deceased or Incompetent Persons, J. HEALTH & B IOMED. L. 147, 158 n.50 (2011) (citing Briana
Rudick et al., The Status of Oocyte Cryopreservation in the United States, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY
2642, 2642-46 (2010)).
285
PGS is used here to refer to any genetic testing of pre-embryos, though some commentators
distinguish between PGS and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). See, e.g., Jaime King, Duty to
the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 379 n.15 (2008) (using the term PGD
with reference to testing for specific genetic or chromosomal diseases).
286
The use of PGS has grown significantly since its introduction in the late 1980s. King , supra
note 285, at 290 n.28.
287
Peters, supra note 174, at 216.
288
Id. at 210-16.
289
For instance, Germany’s Embryo Protection Act includes in its definition of “embryo” “each
totipotent cell removed from an embryo that is assumed to be able to divide and to develop into an
individual under the appropriate conditions.” Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The
Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.),
translation
available
at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf.
290
King, supra note 285, at 292.
291
Id. at 291. In addition to identifying chromosomal abnormalities, PGS can be used to screen
for genetic markers associated with disorders such as Tay-Sachs and Huntington’s, or for
predispositions to certain cancers. Id. at 296.
292
Id. at 295-96.
293
Peters, supra note 174, at 217.
284
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Beyond this, the cell biopsy used to extract the cell to test for genetic
characteristics creates the risk of causing damage to the pre-embryo that could
render it unfit for implantation or otherwise lead to birth defects. 294 As Professor
King has noted, the nature and extent of these risks are not well understood. 295 Logic
might suggest that pre-embryos lacking genetic abnormalities have a higher
probability of leading to successful pregnancy in a given IVF cycle, but certain
studies have shown that pre-embryos implanted after PGS are less likely to result in
pregnancy and birth.296 More research is needed to determine whether the process of
PGS itself is to blame for this increased IVF mortality rate for pre-embryonic
persons. 297 Further, even if implantation and birth are successful, there is the
possibility that removing a cell from the pre-embryo could cause developmental and
other health problems later in life. 298 Knowingly exposing pre-embryonic persons to
these as-yet unquantifiable risks of death or injury could be viewed as problematic
under a personhood framework.
A significant problem with PGS has to do with the lack of benefit that such
testing provides to the pre-embryonic person involved (notwithstanding the clear
benefit to the prospective parents seeking the testing), especially when considering
the risks inherent in the procedure. 299 We currently lack the technology to perform
genetic modification or alteration to correct any genetic abnormality that might be
discovered using PGS. 300 If the IVF patients planned to transfer the pre-embryos
regardless of the PGS results, then perhaps the pre-embryo would benefit in the
future to the extent the patients used this information to plan for raising a child with
the identified condition. But this attenuated benefit would not seem to justify
exposing the pre-embryos to the risks of death or injury identified here.
Beyond this type of utilitarian assessment, the President’s Council on Bioethics
noted that, particularly in the context of using PGS to identify a donor match for an
294

King, supra note 285, at 287.
Id. at 291-96, 303-08.
296
Id. at 292 n.37, 297. The study indicated a 37% live birth rate for IVF patients, decreasing to
25% for patients undergoing PGS. Id. at 287 n.16, 307.
297
Id. at 308.
298
Id. at 307 (noting that the extent of this risk is unknown since many of the children born after
a PGS cycle are not yet through puberty).
299
For purposes of this paper I will bracket off the issue that some couples may only reproduce
because of the availability of PGS, and therefore, PGS could be argued to provide the benefit of
existence itself. This argument could be used by a patient only willing to pa rent a deaf child, which
PGS makes possible through pre-embryo selection. In addition to the benefit, Parfit’s Non-Identity
Problem could be utilized to suggest that the decision to use PGS cannot be said to harm these
resulting persons who are better off alive than not (at least assuming a life worth living). See PARFIT ,
supra note 270, at 358-61. But if the decision to use PGS is made after the pre-embryonic person is
already in existence (for instance by a couple in the midst of using IVF), then the Non -Identity
Problem would not appear to be implicated assuming we consider the genetic interventi on to be
identity preserving, and it is therefore possible to assess whether PGS causes or creates a risk of harm
to this identified person. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem,
and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 352-53 (2008); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating
Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions , 60
HASTINGS L.J. 299, 332-33 (2008). Of course, if the genetic intervention is viewed to be identity
changing, then the argument could be made that this “new,” post-intervention person has not been
harmed, since but for the intervention she would not exist. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying
text for additional discussion of this issue.
300
See John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical Debate,
18
HUM.
R EPROD.
465,
470
(2003),
available
at
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/3/465.full.pdf (explaining that controversial uses of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis would increase if technology for further genetic testing was
available).
295
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already born sibling, PGS could also raise a Kantian 301 concern that such testing
treats pre-embryonic persons as “a means for the benefit of another.”302 These issues
become more apparent when considering that in the absence of PGS, all pre-embryos
that pass visual inspection would likely be implanted or at least temporarily
cryopreserved.303
Leaving aside the eugenic implications of using PGS to select offspring with
desired traits, 304 under a personhood framework, PGS would appear to be
particularly susceptible to outlaw or severe restriction due to the risks involved and
the questionable benefits to the pre-embryonic persons on whom testing is
performed.305 Although currently unregulated in the United States, 306 other countries
offer examples of what such restrictions on PGS might look like. 307
Italy, Austria, and Switzerland have statutes that ban the practice of PGS
altogether. 308 In addition, the Embryo Protection Act in Germany was historically
interpreted to provide a blanket prohibition on PGS, 309 but a recent court decision 310
led to subsequent legislation that now permits PGS in the narrow circumstances
where the parents have a high risk of passing on a serious genetic disease, or where
the pre-embryo is suspected of carrying a defect that creates a high feasibility of
miscarriage or stillbirth. 311 At the time, three bills were considered in Germany, one
of which would have explicitly prohibited all PGS. 312 Those disfavoring any
301

Utilitarianism and Kantianism are two moral theories that have had profound influence on
Western legal philosophy. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. M URPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN , PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
67-98 (1990). Kant himself might dispute the personhood (or humanity) of pre-embryos given their
inability to engage in rational behavior. Id. at 77.
302
PRESIDENT ’S C OUNCIL ON B IOETHICS, THE R EGULATION OF NEW B IOTECHNOLOGIES 96
(2004), http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe_final_repr
oduction_and_responsibility.pdf.
303
By avoiding immediate destruction these pre-embryos would stand the chance of being saved
by a subsequent personhood framework that would outlaw destruction.
304
See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our
Eugenic Past—Present, and Future?, 36 C ONN. L. R EV. 125 (2003) (exploring the history of eugenics
and how that history should inform regulation of ART).
305
See generally Glenn L. Schattman, Lack of Benefit of Pre-Implantation Genetic Screening, 1
B IENNIAL R EV. INFERTILITY 289 (2009) (explaining that PGS may reduce a woman’s chance of having
a child).
306
See Benjamin B. Williams, Note, Screening for Children: Choice and Change in the “Wild
West” of Reproductive Medicine, 79 GEO. WASH. L. R EV . 1305, 1306-07 n.10 (2011).
307
King, supra note 285, at 136-37.
308
Id. at 137. Italy’s outright ban of PGS was condemned recently by the European Court of
Human Rights in a case involving an Italian couple (both carriers of cystic fibrosis) prevented from
utilizing PGS. Europe Rights Court Condemns Italy Ban on Embryo Testing, R AW STORY (Aug. 28,
2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/08/28/europe-rights-court-condemns-italy-ban-on-embryotesting/ (noting that “of 32 Council of Europe member states examined, only Italy, Austria and
Switzerland ban PGD testing”).
309
King, supra note 285, at 137-38. (citing Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The
Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.),
translation
available
at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf).
310
German Government Divided over Calls for Embryo Protection, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jul. 12,
2010),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/bio-ethical-battleground-german-governmentdivided-over-calls-for-embryo-protection-a-706040.html.
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Gesetz zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Sept. 2, 2011, B UNDESRAT
DRUCKSACHEN
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480/11
(2011)
(Ger.),
available
at
http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_171/SharedDocs/Drucksachen/2011/0401-500/48011,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/480-11.pdf (unofficial translation provided by
Professor Christoph Henkel, Mississippi College School of Law).
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exceptions that would allow PGS argued that it is “unacceptable that [pre-]embryos
could be destroyed through [PGS] procedures,” and that there should “be no
selection between handicapped and non-handicapped life.” 313 It is likely that the
same arguments would be made in support of an absolute prohibition on PGS under
a personhood framework, though certainly other countries regulate PGS without
banning the procedure entirely. 314
3. Transfer, Selective Reduction, and Disposition of Unused Pre-Embryos
After pre-embryos are successfully created, screened, and potentially frozen and
thawed, decisions remain regarding how many to transfer to the woman, what to do
in the event of multiple implantations, and what to do with any pre-embryos that
remain unused. In reverse order, it would be problematic under a personhood
framework to discard unused pre-embryos or to donate them for research. This is
certainly true in Italy where all created pre-embryos must be implanted,315 and it is
also the case in Germany where “[a]nyone who disposes of” a pre-embryo or “uses it
for a purpose not serving its preservation” will be imprisoned for up to three
years. 316 In the United States, Louisiana already makes it is illegal to intentionally
destroy viable pre-embryos,317 and any unused pre-embryos must be made available
for adoption by other IVF patients. 318 Not surprisingly, the initial draft of the
proposed personhood legislation in Georgia also specifically prohibited the
intentional destruction of pre-embryos for any purpose 319 and, as mentioned, even
the revised Georgia language states that pre-embryos may be created “solely for the
purposes of initiating a human pregnancy.”320
Continuing in reverse order, it is also readily apparent that selective
reductions—termination of certain fetuses when multiple implantations occur 321—
would be frowned upon by personhood proponents. This technique may be utilized
to make it safer for the woman and the remaining fetuses, or simply when the
intended parents do not desire to have multiple children, whether the pregnancy is
313

Government Divided, supra note 310.
See generally King, supra note 285 (exploring regulatory models from other countries and
offering a proposal for regulation of PGS in the United States). Professor King notes that in the
Netherlands PGS can only be used to identify “serious conditions,” with a goal of bringing about the
birth of a healthy child. Id. at 166. Personhood proponents would likely be unwilling to entertain a
discussion about whether certain conditions are serious enough to permit the destruction of a human
person, and even if the probability of miscarriage or stillbirth was 100%, proponents may not feel that
PGS is justified.
315
See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
316
Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG] [The Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990,
B UNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 § 2.1 (Ger.), translation available at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf .
317
LA. R EV. STAT . ANN . § 9:129 (2008).
318
Id. § 9:130.
319
S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-63(a) (Ga. 2009), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf
320
See supra note 281.
321
See ASRM, Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY
&
STERILITY
44,
44-45
(2013),
available
at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Gui
delines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_embryos%281%29.pdf
[hereinafter
ASRM Transfer Guidelines]; Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat
Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 773, 777-82 (1992) (describing the procedure as involving
the insertion of a needle through the woman’s abdomen and into the chest of the fetus to inject
potassium chloride in order to stop the fetal heart).
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being carried by the intended mother or a gestational surrogate. 322 It is very unlikely
that personhood proponents would treat selective reduction differently than any
other procedure that terminates a fetus (or pre-embryo for that matter), 323 though
keeping in mind the exceptions available considering the life and health of the
woman experiencing a high-order multiple pregnancy. 324 Proponents also would be
very cognizant of the risk that selective reduction could lead to termination of the
entire pregnancy. 325 Even the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)
acknowledges that high-order multiple pregnancies should be avoided due to the
risks created for the women and fetuses involved. 326
In fact, Octomom327 was identified as a primary reason behind the legislation
proposing IVF restrictions in Georgia. 328 ASRM reported that “in 2000, more than
two-thirds of all IVF transfer procedures in the United States were of three or more
embryos.” 329 While there are no laws currently governing the number of preembryos that may be transferred in a given IVF cycle in the United States, fertility
organizations have offered guidelines calling for a reduced number. 330 For instance,
today ASRM and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART)
recommend that for women under thirty-five, consideration should be given to
implanting only one pre-embryo, and no more than two; though the guidelines still
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suggest that it is acceptable for up to five cleavage-stage pre-embryos (two or three
days after fertilization) to be implanted in women over forty.331
Further, data collected by the CDC suggest that, even in the absence of
regulation, in the vast majority of IVF cycles no more than two or three pre-embryos
are transferred per cycle, 332 and ASRM has documented a decrease in triplet
gestation. 333 There is even some evidence to suggest that mandated insurance
coverage for IVF could lead to reduced multiple-embryo transfers, because there
would be less financial pressure to be successful in fewer attempts. 334 Nevertheless,
if a personhood measure passes, restrictions on the number of pre-embryos that may
be transferred in a given cycle are likely to follow to reduce the number of preembryonic persons put at risk. This is particularly true given that some recent studies
seem to suggest that increasing the number of pre-embryos transferred does not
necessarily increase the likelihood of achieving a successful pregnancy. 335 After a
recent assessment of the literature on single-embryo transfer, ASRM determined that
use of the procedure in the United States “has lagged behind that of many other
countries,” and that “IVF centers should promote [the procedure] when appropriate
through provider and patient education.”336
Perhaps more controversially, the transfer of even a single pre-embryonic
person during an IVF cycle could be considered problematic under a personhood
framework. 337 No clinic boasts a 100% success rate and every failed implantation
results in the death of a pre-embryonic person. While the Federal Government does
not regulate the practice of IVF, the CDC does collect data from clinics on their
success rates.338
The CDC breaks down IVF success rates into a number of categories, such as:
age of the woman, whether frozen or fresh pre-embryos were transferred (including
the number of pre-embryos transferred in a given cycle), and whether donor eggs
were used. 339 Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain the precise number of preembryos transferred that survive through birth, because multiple pre-embryos are
often transferred, each pre-embryo could itself divide to become a multiple, and the
CDC reports multiple-infant births as one live birth. For purposes here the point can
be made by noting that in 2010 the CDC reported that only 36.5% of the fresh, nondonor pre-embryos that were transferred to women under the age of thirty-five
actually implanted, with the percentage of implantation decreasing dramatically for
331
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women over the age of thirty-five. 340 Given that not all of these implantations
resulted in a live birth (due to miscarriage or stillbirth), we can conservatively say
that in 2010 upwards of sixty-five percent of the pre-embryonic persons utilized in
IVF in this country died in the process.341 Under a personhood framework, one could
question whether it is acceptable to knowingly subject these pre-embryonic persons
to such a high risk of death.
Admittedly, while this suggests that IVF causes a tremendous loss of preembryonic life, we should keep in mind that when fertilization occurs naturally in
the human reproductive process, fifty percent of such fertilized ova are thought to be
expelled prior to implantation, and often without the women even knowing
fertilization took place. 342 However, in any given month where a couple has
unprotected sex and the woman does not become pregnant, it is impossible to know
whether fertilization actually occurred. 343 It would thus be inaccurate to claim that
every time a couple has unprotected sex they create a fifty percent chance of killing
a pre-embryonic person. 344 In the context of IVF, however, it is possible to assess the
risk to which an existing pre-embryonic person will be exposed by the transfer
process.345 And according to the CDC, a fresh pre-embryonic person created using a
donor egg and transferred into a woman under the age of thirty-five stands a much
higher chance of surviving (and being born) than would a fresh pre-embryonic
person created from a non-donor egg and transferred to a woman over the age of
forty-two.346
It is true that the death caused by a failed IVF transfer would not likely be
considered intentional (at least using a specific intent definition) under the revised
personhood language being proposed, but the inquiry should not end there. 347
Whether it is acceptable to intentionally create people only to subject them to such a
high risk of mortality is an inquiry that would seem necessary when evaluating the
ultimate permissibility of IVF under a personhood framework. As discussed in
relation to contraception, however, the mere risk of death alone should be
insufficient to necessitate a ban on IVF. Rather, at least with respect to yet-to-be
created pre-embryonic persons, attention should be paid to whether the risk
outweighs the societal benefits, and/or whether certain restrictions could be imposed
to bring the level of risk to an acceptable level. 348 Such restrictions might include
limiting the number of pre-embryos that may be created and transferred in a given
cycle, or outlawing IVF for individuals with a very low chance of success.
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For presently existing pre-embryonic persons (like those in a current state of
cryopreservation), the inquiry would likely focus on whether thawing and transfer
are in such persons’ best interests. 349 Personhood proponents seek to give preembryonic persons the same legal and moral status as every other born person, and
without entertaining any sort of qualitative assessment about the value of such
person’s life.350 By analogy, if we understood that using disposable diapers created a
fifty percent chance of newborn death, would we nonetheless allow parents to use
disposable diapers? Instead, we might expect a moratorium on disposable diapers,
notwithstanding their convenience to parents, until research developed significantly
safer disposable diapers.
Parents obviously enjoy substantial constitutional protection to make decisions
regarding the upbringing of their children, 351 but given the children’s right to life,
“the State, as parens patriae, has a ‘wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare.’” 352 In the medical
context in particular, courts have struggled to identify the scope of parental decisionmaking authority. 353 IVF patients could argue that being born, as opposed to
remaining in a pre-embryonic state, is in the best interests of the given child, since
birth offers the brightest future whereby the child would experience all that life has
to offer. They may even argue that this better future is worth the risk of death
associated with the IVF process. Indeed, parents make decisions every day that they
hope will create the brightest future for their children.
But keeping in mind that under a personhood framework the pre-embryonic
person already has full legal and moral status, without reference to qualitative
assessments about their life, 354 the counter argument might look something like this:
while it may be true that, as compared to sitting on the couch every day watching
Keeping up with the Kardashians,355 parents have the best interests of their children
in mind when forcing them to attend a four-year college (thereby offering them the
best chance of a bright future); if attendance at that school carries with it a fifty
percent (or greater) chance of death, would the parents still be justified in forcing
their children off the couch? The purpose of this paper is not to resolve this
argument, but only to raise it as an illustration of why IVF may be at risk of
significant restriction under a personhood framework.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of the Personhood Movement is to create a framework in which human
life is extended constitutional protection from the earliest moments of biological
development, without exception. 356 Although personhood proponents may be evasive
349
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in public debates, if passed, the revised personhood measures being proposed across
the country that include this unqualified, biological definition of life, are likely to
have significant impacts on reproductive choice. This highlights why it is important
to confront what accepting pre-embryonic personhood would mean.
If proponents intend to remain consistent with the personhood position, then any
forms of contraception or reproductive technologies that place pre-embryonic
persons at significant risk of injury or death become problematic. This is not to say
that, from a normative standpoint, all such reproductive choices ought to be banned
outright. Rather, to maintain consistency with the position we ought to ask whether
such activities create an unacceptable risk of loss of human life, and/or whether such
activities are in the best interests of the pre-embryonic persons involved. The
purpose of this article has not been to answer those questions; only to create a space
for those discussions to be held, and to offer examples of what the restrictions on
reproductive choice coming out of those discussions might look like. 357
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APPENDIX I: PROPOSED COLORADO PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT
SECTION 32. THE RIGHT TO LIFE.
(1) PURPOSE. In order to affirm basic human dignity, be it resolved that the right
to life in this constitution applies equally to all innocent persons.
(2) EFFECT. The intentional killing of any innocent person is prohibited.
(a) Only birth control that kills a person shall be affected by this section.
(b) Only in vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person
shall be affected by this section.
(c) Medical treatment for life threatening physical conditions intended to
preserve life shall not be affected by this section.
(d) Spontaneous miscarriages shall not be affected by this section.
(e) No innocent child created through rape or incest shall be killed for the
crime of his or her father.
(3) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section,
(a) “Person” applies to every human being regardless of the method of
creation.
(b) A “human being” is a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage
of development.
(c) “Spontaneous miscarriage” is the unintentional termination of a
pregnancy.
(d) “Child” includes a human being prior to and during birth.
(e) “Medical treatment for life threatening physical conditions intended to
preserve life” includes but is not limited to treatment for cancer, ectopic and
molar pregnancy, twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome, and placenta previa.
(4) SELF-EXECUTING, AND SEVERABILITY PROVISION. All provisions of this
section are self-executing and are severable. 358
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